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FUENTES, Circuit Judge:  
Following an eight-month criminal trial, a jury 
convicted Atlantic States Cast Iron Pipe Company and four of 
its managers of various crimes.  These included conspiring to 
commit a host of environmental pollution and worker safety 
violations, attempting to cover up or impede federal 
investigation of those violations, and substantive violations of 
the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act.  Specifically, the 
Defendants were found to have illegally pumped 
contaminated water into storm drains and, as a result, into the 
Delaware River; to have unlawfully burned 50-gallon drums 
of paint waste in a cupola and emitted the fumes from those 
activities into the air; and to have attempted to cover up 
several work-related accidents at its facility, one of which 
resulted in the death of an employee.  The jury also found that 
the Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to commit these 
acts—and to impede the resulting federal investigation—in 
order to maximize productivity and profits at the Plant.  
The Defendants appealed from the jury’s verdict, 
raising a litany of issues relating to pre-trial discovery, the 
District Court’s handling of the trial itself, the propriety of 
certain jury instructions, and the District Court’s sentencing 
determinations.  For the reasons that follow, and in light of 
the District Court’s fine handling of these extraordinarily 
complicated proceedings, we will affirm the final judgments 
of conviction and sentence in this case. 
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I. Facts & Posture 
A. Factual Background1
1. The Defendants 
 
Atlantic States Cast Iron Pipe Company (the “Company”), 
owned by McWane, Inc., operates a pipe foundry in 
Phillipsburg, New Jersey.  The Plant, which produces ductile 
iron pipes used as municipal water pipes, sits on a 33-acre 
facility located just one mile from the Delaware River.  Prior 
to 2002, the facility had several large storm drains that flowed 
through the municipal storm sewers to an outfall pipe that fed 
into the Delaware River.2
During the periods in question, the Plant was overseen by 
John Prisque, who became the Plant Manager in 1998.  Prior 
to that, Prisque served as the Production Superintendent and 
the Production Manager. 
 
 Jeffrey Maury, like Prisque, had a long career at the 
Plant.  After serving as the Maintenance Foreman from 1995 
                                              
1 A more detailed discussion of the evidence introduced at 
trial can be found in the District Court’s comprehensive 
opinion.  United States v. Atl. States Cast Iron Pipe Co., No. 
03-852, 2007 WL 2282514, at *69-133 (D.N.J. Aug. 2, 2007).   
2 After 2002, the Company overhauled its internal sewage and 
drainage systems and completely removed itself from the 
city’s sewer system.  The Company says that this eliminated 
any risk of future discharges into the Delaware River and 
allowed them to conserve water for use at the Plant.   
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to 1997, Maury was promoted to Maintenance Superintendent 
in 1998.  In this position, Maury oversaw the maintenance of 
all equipment used in the casting and finishing of the 
Company’s pipes and of construction equipment, such as 
forklifts.  He also supervised all of the Plant’s maintenance 
foremen.  Maury reported directly to Prisque. 
 All finishing processes at the Plant, including the 
cement lining and pipe painting operations, were overseen by 
Craig Davidson, who served as the Finishing Superintendent 
beginning in March 1998.  Like Maury, Davidson reported 
directly to Prisque.   
 Scott Faubert served as the Plant’s Human Resources 
Manager from 1996 to September 2000.  His job 
responsibilities included overseeing the Plant’s health and 
safety programs and supervising the Plant’s Safety Director.  
Faubert also reported directly to Prisque. 
2. The Plant 
As part of the Company’s production process, 
employees at the Plant melt scrap iron and steel at an 
extremely high heat in a cupola, or furnace.  The molten 
metal is then poured into a pipe cast and passed through an 
oven that makes the pipes ductile.  From there, the pipes are 
sent to the finishing department, where they are cooled with 
water, grinded, pressure tested, lined with cement, rinsed and 
painted.  Much of the machinery used during this process 
relies on hydraulic cylinders and petroleum-based hydraulic 
fluid.  This process produces contaminated water and air 
pollutants, which are governed by the Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
7401 et seq., respectively.  Discharges of any such 
contaminated water and emissions of any such air pollutant 
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are controlled by strict permits issued to the Company by the 
relevant policing agency.  
As an industrial facility, the Plant is also subject to the 
requirements of the Occupational Health and Safety Act, as 
administered by the Occupational Health and Safety 
Administration (“OSHA”).  See 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.  
OSHA has promulgated volumes of regulations designed to 
ensure that workers can perform their jobs without substantial 
risk of industrial accident.  Under OSHA’s regulations, the 
Plant is required to comply with certain health and safety 
standards, educate employees about workplace safety, and 
report any on-the-job injuries.  Certain categories of 
workplace injuries, including those involving a fatality or the 
risk of an ongoing imminent danger at a facility, are subject 
to investigation by a regional OSHA inspector.  
The Defendants in this case were charged with and 
convicted of conspiring to violate these regulatory schemes 
and to impede federal investigations into those violations.  
They were also separately charged with and convicted of 
several of the underlying violations.  The sections that follow 
describe these violations in turn.  
B. Clean Water Act Violations 
Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (the “CWA”) to 
preserve the environmental and physical integrity of the 
national waterways.  33 U.S.C. § 1251.  To that end, the 
CWA “prohibits the discharge of any pollutant into waters of 
the United States except as expressly authorized.”  United 
States v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 366 F.3d 164, 171 (3d Cir. 
2004).  Chemical or industrial waste constitutes a pollutant.  
33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).  An individual wishing to discharge 
such a substance must first obtain a National Pollution 
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Discharge Elimination System permit (a “discharge permit”) 
from the relevant agency overseeing the program—in this 
case, the New Jersey Department of Environmental 
Protection (“NJDEP”).3
The Company held a discharge permit that 
fundamentally allowed the Plant to discharge two types of 
substances:  (1) storm water runoff (e.g., rainwater); and (2) 
“non-contact cooling water”—i.e. water that has not come 
into contact with any industrial machinery or its associated 
pollutants.   Atl. States, 2007 WL 2282514, at *14.  To 
qualify as “non-contact cooling water,” the discharged water 
could have no visible sheen, had to pass tests designed to 
measure petroleum hydrocarbon levels, and could contain no 
solid debris.  At no point was the Company permitted to 
discharge wastewater created from the cleaning of equipment, 
the pipes produced in the Plant, or the Plant’s facilities.  
  Any discharge must comply with the 
terms of the permit, and the restrictions set out in the CWA.  
Id. § 1342(k).    
1. Unlawful Discharge of Wastewater  
The Plant uses large volumes of water at several stages 
of its manufacturing process, producing both noncontact 
                                              
3 Pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) and (c), the Environmental 
Protection Agency (the “EPA”) may authorize the issuance 
and enforcement of discharge permits by analogous state 
agencies so long as the state program meets federal 
requirements set forth under the Act.  New Jersey has 
administered its own discharge permit program since 1982.  
See 47 Fed. Reg. 17,331 (Apr. 22, 1982).  
 12 
 
cooling water and wastewater.  During the relevant time 
periods, water was pumped from large containment tanks 
through the Plant via a closed-loop system, and was used to 
cool the pipes after casting, to cool the casting machines 
themselves and to cool the cupola.  The Plant also used water 
to rinse the pipes during the cement lining process and 
afterward, prior to painting.  Both processes yielded non-
dischargeable wastewater.  
a) The Number Four Pit   
While some of the cooling water burned off as steam, 
the Plant’s cooling processes—the casting process in 
particular—also generated wastewater.  During the casting 
process, the water used to cool the pipes dripped from the 
closed-loop recirculation system into a pit—referred to as the 
Number Four Pit—located beneath the casting machine. 4
                                              
4 Robert Bobinis was a millwright and foreman at the Plant 
and worked in the casting area.  He testified that the water 
system in the casting area was designed to be a closed-loop, 
sealed system that recirculated the water used in the 
production process.  However, the system did not function 
this way.  Though the Plant also had a wastewater treatment 
process for this closed-loop system, employees testified that 
the water treatment facility was inoperable for much of the 
period in question.  
 
Because the machines also dripped hydraulic oil into the pit, 
the water in the Number Four Pit was often contaminated.   
The Number Four Pit was positioned adjacent to the “bull 
ladle pit,” in which molten iron from the cupola was held, and 
had to be watched carefully to ensure that it did not overflow 
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into the bull ladle pit and cause an explosion.  Workers 
testified that the pit was typically full and that the need to 
drain the pit varied day to day, depending on the severity of 
the leaks from the machinery above.   
To drain the Number Four Pit, workers were supposed 
to pump the wastewater through trenches that ran alongside 
the casting equipment and into large holding tanks located 
outside the building.  However, both during production and 
during the night-shift maintenance activities, the workers 
were instructed to pump into the tanks even if the tanks were 
too full to handle more wastewater.  The result of this 
pumping was that the tanks overflowed, sending “dark, hot, 
muddy water” flowing down the roadway alongside the Plant, 
and into the nearby storm drains.   Id. at *118.  Night-shift 
employees were also sometimes instructed to pump the water 
out of the pit and directly onto the ground outside the Plant.  
Though the frequency of this pumping depended on how 
much the machinery leaked in a given day, employees 
estimated that the discharges from the Number Four Pit 
occurred once or twice a week. Robert Bobinis, who worked 
in the casting area of the Plant, noted that he mentioned the 
overflow problem to Maury one day and told Maury, “I’m not 
going to jail for this.”  Maury responded only with, “Shhh.”  
Id. at *120.  
b) The Cement Pit    
Like the Number Four Pit, the Cement Pit suffered 
from too much wastewater and too little storage.  Water from 
the Plant’s cement washing process gathered in containment 
pits below the cement lining equipment and then flowed, via 
trenches or troughs, to the Cement Pit located outside the 
building.  Along the way, this water collected the cement 
debris and hydraulic oil that had accumulated during the 
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manufacturing process. Once in the pit, the debris sunk to the 
bottom and the oil floated to the top.  As a result of these 
pollutants, water in the cement pits had a greenish, oily 
appearance.   
During production, this wastewater remained in the pit.  
The oil was supposed to be skimmed from the top of the 
water, and the water itself recycled through the Plant and 
reused for cement washing.  However, over time, the debris at 
the bottom of the pit would accumulate and displace the water 
in the pit, until it began to interfere with production.  This 
required that the pit water be removed, usually at the end of 
the production week, so that maintenance workers could 
scrape the bottom of the pit of debris. Workers were supposed 
to clean the pit by pumping the water out and into hazardous 
materials tanks that were maintained and emptied by outside 
contractors.  In 1999, the Plant altered this system, installing 
next to the pit a large, brown tank specifically intended to 
hold the water during cleaning and allow for its reuse 
afterward.  When the tank was full, workers were to pump 
any excess water into the preexisting hazardous materials 
tank, located across the roadway, for disposal.  
In reality, however, these practices were routinely 
disregarded in favor of illegally pumping the wastewater onto 
the roadway and, as a result, into the facility’s storm drains.5
                                              
5 Testimony at trial indicated that the large brown tank, 
installed to hold this excess water, clogged frequently as a 
result of the debris in the water.  Thus, shortly after it was 
installed in 1999, it became largely inoperative and was used 
only sporadically.   
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During the night-shift and, in particular, on Friday nights, 
maintenance workers were instructed to “pump the pit” by 
emptying the wastewater onto the nearby roadway.  Id. at 
*102.  After the pit was emptied, workers put the pumps away 
and cleared the debris from the bottom of the pit.  They then 
re-filled the pit with water so that production could resume 
during the morning shift.  Employees testified that some of 
these orders came directly from Davidson, the head of the 
Finishing Department.  Other employees testified that they 
received their orders from their shift foreman.  As with the 
discharges from the Number Four Pit, this water flowed from 
the roadway into the nearby storage drains and, eventually, 
into the Delaware River.  
 This practice appears to have continued until February 
2000, when environmental inspectors began looking into 
possible spills from the Plant.  At that point, workers began 
pumping the cement pit water into the hazmat tanks.  
However, because those tanks were frequently full, the 
cement water still occasionally spilled over the sides of the 
tank, down the roadway to the storm drains and, eventually, 
into the river. 
2. Resulting Oil Spills & Ensuing 
Investigations 
The unpermitted discharges from the Plant resulted in 
at least three separate oil spills on the Delaware River.  
Statements made by the individual defendants to the state and 
federal investigators looking into these spills would later 
serve as the basis for some of the false statements and 
obstruction charges in the indictment.  
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a) March 1998 
On March 19, 1998, New Jersey residents reported 
seeing an oil slick on the Delaware River.  An employee of 
the Phillipsburg Department of Public Works investigated and 
traced the spill to a large outfall pipe in the vicinity of the 
Plant.  The discharge was eventually traced to the facility 
itself.  The local agency sent the Company a letter, copied to 
the NJDEP, requesting that the facility take measures to avoid 
such spills going forward.  
b) December 1999 
 On December 5, 1999, another local resident noticed a 
large sheen of oil—later estimated to contain approximately 
200 – 300 gallons of liquid petroleum6
Later that same day, Doyle and the Chief of the 
Phillipsburg Fire Department, Richard Hay, went to the 
—floating on the 
Delaware River.  The resident reported the sighting to local 
authorities, which again triggered an investigation.  Local 
authorities contacted Bruce Doyle, an emergency response 
specialist for the NJDEP, who began by visiting the location 
at which the sheen was spotted.  He took photographs and 
collected samples of the water, and noted that he believed the 
discharge had been continuing for some time based on the 
amount of oil that he observed in the river. Doyle traced the 
discharge to an outfall pipe near the Plant.  
                                              
6 Estimates were that this amount of petroleum, mixed with 
approximately 20 times that amount in wastewater, had been 
discharged into the river. 
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Company’s facility, where they were initially denied entry.  
While waiting outside the facility’s gates, Doyle observed 
large, oily puddles on the ground inside the gates.  He could 
also see discharge flowing into two storm drains, one of 
which was near what he later learned to be the cement pit.  He 
also observed a “partially-submerged sump pump that was 
not operating at the time.”  Id.  at *111.  Doyle testified that it 
appeared to him that the water flowing into the drains had 
come from the exposed end of the sump pump lying on the 
roadway.   
Once allowed into the facility, Doyle confirmed that 
the cement containment pond was the source of the discharge 
he had observed at the outfall.  Doyle also had an opportunity 
to speak with Joseph Maddock, the Plant’s safety director, 
who reported directly to Faubert.  Maddock said he had no 
information on the sump pump or hose in the pit and told 
Doyle that “he had no idea what had caused the discharge.”  
Id. at *112.  Doyle told Maddock that the Company was 
directed to clean up the spill at the Plant and at the outfall.   
NJDEP officials obtained a search warrant to examine 
the facility, and returned to the Plant on February 24, 2000.  
They were accompanied by officers from the New Jersey 
Department of Law and Public Safety, Christopher Fernicola 
and Jeffrey Hill; and FBI Special Agent James Spence.  
Doyle was also present.  At that time, the cement pit’s 
condition was again full of debris, oil and milky-green water, 
and was fuller than it had been on December 5.  Investigators 
collected a sump pump and hose, not in use, from around the 
pit and took those items into evidence.  Investigators also 
took photographs of the area and sampled water from the pit.  
Later tests confirmed that the liquid in the pit matched the 
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liquid that had flowed through the storm drains and into the 
Delaware River.  
During this visit, officials interviewed Maury, 
Davidson and Prisque.  Agents Fernicola and Hill interviewed 
Maury.  Maury told them that he thought the leak had been 
caused by a leak in the hydraulic line on one of the street 
sweeper trucks used at the Plant.  Agent Fernicola testified 
that Maury fidgeted in his chair and wrung his hands 
throughout the interview.7  Davidson told Agent Hill that the 
discharge was caused by a hole in the hose that led from the 
sump pump to the storage tank where the water was held 
before being recirculated through the system.8
c) April 2000  
  Like 
Davidson, Prisque attributed the discharge to a hole in the 
sump pump hose.   
On April 16, 2000, Doyle was again called to 
investigate reports of a floating oil sheen on the Delaware 
River.  This sheen was smaller, but was still visible from the 
road.  Doyle again traced the spill back to the outfall pipe 
near the Company’s facility, this time observing oil and a 
“cement-like material” in the discharge.  Id. at *113.  Doyle 
went to the Plant later that day and noted that, though there 
had been rainfall that day, the roads surrounding the Plant did 
not have puddles and were dry, indicating that the oil 
                                              
7 Fernicola also testified that he believed that Maury was 
lying at the time of the interview.   
8 Davidson’s pager went off at some point during the 
interview.  Afterward, he refused to be interviewed further.   
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discharge had not been caused by surface rainfall washing the 
oil from the ground into the drain.  He also observed a large 
oil sheen surrounding a grated drain at the facility and 
concluded that drain had been the source of the sheen he 
observed on the river.9
In light of these discharges and the oil spills, the 
Defendants—the Company, Maury, Davidson and Prisque—
were eventually charged with violations of the Clean Water 
Act § 1319(c).  They were also charged with lying to 
investigators about the source of the 1999 spill.   
  The NJDEP again issued a directive 
and notice of violation against the Company.   
C. Clean Air Act Violations  
The Clean Air Act (the “CAA”), overseen by the EPA 
but administered at the local level by the NJDEP, provides 
that “certain stationary sources of air pollution must obtain 
federal operating permits” prior to any emissions.  Ocean 
Cnty Landfill Corp. v. United States EPA, 631 F.3d 652, 654 
(3d Cir. 2011) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661-7661f, 7661a(d)(1), 
40 C.F.R. § 70, App. A).  Because the Company’s 
manufacturing process involves the smelting of metals in a 
cupola, it was required to obtain and comply with an NJDEP-
issued emissions permit. 
                                              
9 The District Court speculated that this smaller discharge 
may have been caused by “passive weekend leaking onto the 
roadway of cement pit water pumped to the hazmat pit, 
enhanced by the rain event of that day, and perhaps swept 
from the blacktop at Atlantic States before NJDEP arrived to 
check.”  Atl. States, 2007 WL 2282514, at n.141.  
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1. The Plant’s CAA Permits 
The Plant’s cupola, which was approximately 70 to 80 
feet high, required the use of various fuels in order to heat or 
“charge” the furnace to a temperature high enough to melt 
scrap metal to make the cast iron pipes.  The Company held 
operating permits at all times relevant to this case.  In 
addition to regulating how the emissions were to be measured 
and reported to the NJDEP, the operating permits also 
governed what fuels could be sent into the cupola and what 
amount of pollutant emissions could be released into the air.   
Under the relevant permits, the Company could use 
only certain types of fuel.  The Plant typically used coke, but 
was also permitted to use non-hazardous waste paint in 
limited amounts.  At all times relevant to this case, the Plant 
was permitted to burn no more than 55 gallons of non-
hazardous waste paint per day.10
As for the Plant’s emissions levels, the Company was 
permitted to release from the cupola’s stack no more than 
2,500 parts per million of carbon monoxide per hour, 
averaged over the course of a day.  Three times per quarter, 
the Company was permitted to burn up to 4,000 parts per 
million of carbon dioxide per hour, averaged over the course 
  No material other than a 
permissible fuel and the scrap metal being melted were to be 
burned in the cupola.  In particular, hazardous waste paint—
essentially, fresh, liquid paint—was never a permitted fuel, 
since it releases higher levels of volatile organic chemicals 
when burned.   
                                              
10 Prior to 2001, the Plant was permitted to burn 55 gallons of 
non-hazardous waste per hour.   
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of a day.  Any amount beyond these levels, termed an 
“exceedance,” was in violation of the Plant’s operating permit 
and had to be reported to the NJDEP.  Atl. States, 2007 WL 
2282514, at *124.  The Plant had a long, documented history 
of failure to comply with these limitations and, as of late 
2000, was facing fines of approximately $600,000 for 
documented exceedances.  Prisque would have known about 
these exceedances and any others because, as Plant Manager, 
he was responsible for certifying the Plant’s compliance and 
exceedance reports to the NJDEP.   
2. Burning Excess Paint 
The pipe finishing process, during which the pipes 
were painted inside and/or outside, generated large volumes 
of waste paint.  The Plant’s disposal method for this waste, at 
least in part, was to burn it in the Plant’s cupola in violation 
of the Company’s operating permit. 
As automated machines spray painted each pipe, 
excess paint dripped and collected on the floor below the 
paint machine, forming a thick, tarry coating.  During the 
night shift, once production had stopped, workers used flat 
shovels to scoop the waste paint into 55-gallon drums, 
generally filling them 2–3 inches from the top of the drum.  
Some employees testified that they also placed paint-covered 
plastic drop cloths—not permitted in the cupola—in the 
drums.  The workers then placed small pieces of iron called 
“chill” in each drum so that the crane, which used a magnet to 
lift things, could lift them.  The workers then sealed the 
drums, duct taped the seam of the lid and moved the drums to 
the scrap yard.  
Employee testimony at trial demonstrated that these 
drums of waste paint frequently were burned in the cupola. 
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After placing the drums in the scrap yard, cranes would lift 
the drums into the cupola and burn them.  In addition to waste 
paint, the drums often contained the plastic tarps on which the 
paint had gathered under the painting station.  Employees of 
the Plant testified that Davidson instructed them to handle the 
paint in this way, that he did so specifically when the drums 
started to build up in the scrap yard, and that workers filled 
and moved somewhere between four and ten drums per night.  
The Plant disposed of waste paint this way as early as 1999, 
burning an average of four drums a day.   
NJDEP officials first spotted large collections of 55-
gallon drums in the scrap yard in February 2000, while they 
were executing the search warrant to investigate the 1999 
wastewater discharge into the Delaware River.  Officials 
photographed the drums, some of which were sealed and 
others of which were open, exposing a black, tarry substance.   
Going forward, the Company made efforts to hide any 
existing drums from state officials when they visited the 
Plant, or to dispose of them prior to the officials’ arrival.  One 
crane operator testified that, in anticipation of an expected 
NJDEP visit in 2003, his supervisor told him to put one 55-
gallon drum of paint per hour into the cupola.  When the 
crane would not lift some of the drums, he was told to bury 
them in scrap metal so that they would not be visible.  George 
Shepherd, the former General Electrical Foreman and a key 
government witness at trial, testified that this incident 
occurred around April 2003.  He explained that this was fairly 
standard practice any time “visitors” came to the facility.  
Prisque would instruct them to “make sure there’s nothing out 
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in the plant they could find.” 11
Moreover, both the workers and their supervisors 
understood that burning the paint in the cupola was causing 
the Plant to exceed the emissions cap in its operating permit.  
Shepherd testified that he reported this concern to Prisque in 
2003, after the aforementioned incident, but that Prisque told 
him that the paint had nothing to do with the meter readings 
and said, “Don’t go there.”  Atl. States, 2007 WL 2282514, at 
*128. 
  Id. at *128.  Shortly after the 
NJDEP inspectors visited, Prisque directed Shepherd to get 
rid of the drums that had been buried.  Shepherd said that the 
Plant burned approximately 20 55-gallon drums of waste 
paint in the cupola that day, and another 15-20 drums the 
next.   
In light of these practices, Prisque and the Company 
were eventually charged with violating the Clean Air Act 
between February and August 2003.   
D. OSHA Incidents   
Between 1999 and 2002, several of the Company’s 
employees suffered severe injuries at the Plant due to unsafe 
working conditions. The evidence introduced at trial 
demonstrated that the Company’s management took steps to 
conceal the cause of those injuries and to obstruct OSHA 
investigators’ inquiries. 
                                              
11 The crane operator also testified that Prisque had given him 
similar instructions.  
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1. The Coxe Fatality 
On March 24, 2000, Al Coxe, an employee at the 
Plant, was run over and killed by a forklift driven by Juan De 
Los Santos.  De Los Santos had never been trained, as 
required, on the forklift and this was his second accident.   
OSHA officials were notified of the accident, as required by 
law.   
Safety Compliance Officer Carol Tiedeman was 
assigned to investigate the facility and arrived that same 
morning.  Faubert, the Human Resources Manager and the 
individual in charge of overseeing safety at the Plant, met 
with Tiedeman and showed her the scene of the accident.  
Faubert informed Tiedeman that the forklift driver had not 
been properly trained on the equipment.  He also showed her 
the forklift—referred to as forklift #24—which appeared to 
be working properly, and assured Tiedeman that it had been 
untouched since the accident.  As she was leaving the facility 
that day, Tiedeman instructed Faubert to gather any 
inspection sheets for the forklift.  She recommended that 
Faubert have the forklift completely inspected before it be 
used again.   
When Tiedeman returned to the Plant on April 7, 2000, 
she met with Faubert and his subordinate, Joe Maddock, the 
employee charged with maintaining the Plant’s OSHA injury 
log.  She was given an inspection report, dated the day after 
the Coxe accident, which noted that Maury and Yukna, the 
garage mechanic, had inspected forklift #24 and found it to be 
in “perfect operating condition.”  Id. at *77.  In later visits to 
the Plant, however, Tiedeman was given the opportunity to 
review several drivers’ maintenance checklists for forklift #24 
from immediately before and immediately after the accident.  
Almost all of those checklists noted extensive problems with 
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the forklift, including that the brakes were defective.  
Moreover, the forklift’s repair logs showed no work 
performed on the forklift, suggesting that it could not have 
been in “perfect” condition during or immediately after the 
Coxe accident.  Id.  Indeed, despite Faubert’s representations 
to the contrary, later investigations demonstrated that the 
Company’s management had concealed the fact that the 
brakes on forklift # 24 had not been functioning at the time 
that Coxe was run over, and that this was the cause of the 
accident.   
As a general matter, testimony and equipment records 
from the Plant demonstrated that the Plant’s forklifts were 
often in disrepair, with brake failure being one of several 
recurring maintenance problems.  Forklift operators 
repeatedly reported problems with the machines, but were 
told to drive the equipment or risk losing their jobs.  These 
forklift operators testified that, in order to make do, they 
routinely brought their own brake fluid to work, and many 
learned how to drop the forklift’s load in order to stop the 
machine without brakes.  In fact, forklift #24 had been 
reported as having brake problems during the shift 
immediately prior to the fatal accident.   
Shepherd testified that, just after Coxe’s death, Prisque 
told Maury to have Shepherd take forklift #24 to the 
maintenance area for inspection.  There, Shepherd and Maury 
confirmed that the brakes had malfunctioned.  Shepherd 
instructed Yukna to fix the problem.12
                                              
12 Yukna did not testify at trial.  
  When Shepherd saw 
the forklift later that morning, around the time of the OSHA 
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visit, he noted that the brakes were working again and 
assumed they had been fixed.  At some point during the 
morning, Prisque also held a meeting with Maury, Davidson, 
Shepherd, and two others.  Shepherd said that, at this 
meeting, he was instructed to make preparations for the 
inevitable OSHA visit, which might include a walk through 
the facility.   
Robert Rush, another employee who testified at trial, 
stated that Prisque told him to lie about the condition of the 
forklift, and to tell OSHA investigators that “the forklift was 
fully operational, it was safe, and [De Los Santos] was 
driving recklessly.”  Id.  at *89.  When Rush told Prisque that 
he did not want to lie, Prisque threatened him and said, 
“You’re going to tell them this because your job depends on 
it.  It’s in the best interest of your employment.  In the best 
interest of your job somewhere down the line.”  Id.   
2. The Marchan Incident 
Gabriel Marchan, a plant supervisor, was struck by a 
forklift driven by De Los Santos on April 27, 1999.  Though 
the accident occurred in 1999, OSHA first learned about 
Marchan’s injury in 2000, while investigating the Coxe 
accident.  There had been no prior investigation into the 
accident because Marchan’s injury had not been recorded, as 
required, in the Plant’s OSHA 200 logs—logs in which 
employers are required to record workplace injuries.  
In April 2000, while investigating the Coxe accident, 
Tiedeman read a news article which stated that the forklift 
driver who had run over Coxe had been involved in a similar 
incident at the Plant the year before.  When Tiedeman asked 
Faubert about this incident, he chuckled and stated that 
Marchan’s leg had been broken.  Tiedeman requested a copy 
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of Marchan’s accident report.  The evidence presented at trial 
demonstrated that the Defendants thereafter took steps to 
conceal the extent of Marchan’s injuries from OSHA. 
In May 2000, Faubert provided Tiedeman with a 
statement from Marchan that stated falsely that he had come 
back to work the day following the accident.  When 
Tiedeman, confused, asked about the broken leg, Faubert 
changed his story and said that there had been no broken leg.  
When Tiedeman asked why the injury had not been recorded, 
as required, Faubert again stated that this was because the leg 
had not been broken and because Marchan had returned to 
work the next day.  In light of these discrepancies, Officer 
Tiedeman opted to interview Marchan directly.   
Marchan testified that, just before his interview with 
Tiedeman in July 2000, Faubert threatened to fire him unless 
he lied about his injuries.  Marchan thus told Tiedeman that 
he had been struck and run over by a forklift, but that he had 
only sustained a scratch and a bruise as a result.  He denied 
having been seriously injured.  
That same day, Tiedeman also interviewed Faubert 
and his subordinate, Maddock, regarding the Plant’s failure to 
log the Marchan accident.  Maddock stated that he understood 
that OSHA required employers to report employees’ on-site 
injuries and any restrictions on their ability to work, and said 
that it was his job to decide whether to include an injury in 
the OSHA log, based on the description of that injury in the 
Plant’s own first aid log.  Maddock denied having been at the 
Plant on the day that Marchan was run over.  When Tiedeman 
asked Maddock why Marchan’s injury had not been recorded 
and whether Marchan had missed any work because of it, 
Faubert interjected that Marchan had not been treated at the 
plant and that, as a result, no OSHA log entry was made.  
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It was only later, in reviewing subpoenaed company 
records that Officer Tiedeman learned that Faubert, Maddock 
and Marchan had lied to her.  Despite their representations to 
the contrary, Marchan had been seriously injured and placed 
on restricted duty for 44 days following his accident.  Indeed, 
Marchan testified that, immediately after the accident, it was 
Maddock who had driven him to the hospital for treatment.  
After his leg had been placed in a splint, and despite his pleas 
that he be allowed to go home because he was in pain, it was 
also Maddock who drove him back to the Plant and forced 
him to sit in a chair and paint from a bucket for the rest of the 
day.  During the remainder of the time that his leg was in a 
cast, another employee drove him to and from work.  The 
Company had an obligation to report Marchan’s injury, and 
the fact that he was limited to restricted duty for the month 
and a half after his accident, to OSHA but had failed to do so. 
3. The Owens Incident  
On June 25, 1999, employee Robert Owens was 
injured and lost his eye when a piece of a rotating blade from 
the cut saw he was using broke off from the blade and struck 
him in the face.  OSHA compliance officer Alex Salerno was 
assigned to investigate the incident and to assess whether 
adequate safety features had been in place at the time of 
Owens’ injury. 
Salerno visited the Plant roughly two weeks after 
Owens’ accident, met with Faubert and was escorted to the 
site of the accident.  At that time, he witnessed a worker 
operating the machine from behind a sliding plexiglas shield 
with a wooden frame and a wire mesh screen that was 
designed to protect the worker.  Salerno observed that the 
shield appeared to have been newly built, but Faubert assured 
him that it had existed in that condition for 16 years.   The 
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employee at the machine told Salerno the shield had been in 
place for 10 years.   
Despite these representations, evidence and testimony 
at trial indicated that no wire mesh safety shield had been in 
place on the day of Owens’ accident.  Rather, the plexiglass 
and wire mesh covering had been built by a carpenter a few 
days after Owens’ injury.  The employee who told Salerno 
otherwise later testified at trial that Prisque instructed him to 
say that the shield “was always there” and that he lied to 
Officer Salerno because he wanted to keep his job.  Id. at *84. 
4. The Velarde Incident   
 Attempts to conceal deficient safety measures and 
employee injuries were made again in December 2002, after 
Hector Velarde lost three fingers in a cement mixer accident.  
Velarde was cleaning the mixer on December 7, 2002, when 
his co-worker activated the mixer without alerting him.  
When the mixer’s blades activated, Velarde’s fingers were 
amputated.  Officer Tiedeman was the OSHA inspector 
assigned to investigate Velarde’s injury.   
 On Tiedeman’s first visit to the Plant to investigate this 
incident, she met with Prisque, Don Harbin, the Plant’s 
maintenance manager, and Mark Neetz, then the Plant’s 
safety director.  All three individuals escorted her to the 
mixer, and Harbin explained what had happened during the 
accident.  When Tiedeman asked whether the machine had 
come with a safety switch or interlock switch—designed to 
shut down the machine if the doors were open—she was 
assured that it had not, but was told the Plant would attempt 
to install one itself.  
 In truth, the mixer had come from the manufacturer 
with an interlock switch installed, but Prisque had instructed 
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Shepherd to bypass the switch because it slowed 
production.13
 Tiedeman only learned that the mixer actually had 
been manufactured and shipped to the Plant with a 
functioning interlock switch in February 2003, when she 
requested and reviewed the owner’s manual for the 
equipment.  The manual explicitly warned of the risks of 
bypassing the safety feature.  When she confronted Harbin 
with this discovery, he confessed that there had originally 
been a switch, but said that it had only functioned for a day or 
two before it got too dirty to operate properly.  He also 
speculated that the switch had been removed by an employee 
no longer at the Company and said he could not provide a 
name for that individual.   
  Shepherd testified that prior to Tiedeman’s 
arrival, at Prisque’s instruction, he had removed all evidence 
that he had bypassed the switch in the first place and had 
rigged the machine to look as though no interlock switch ever 
existed.  Before Tiedeman’s second visit to the Plant, 
Shepherd reinstalled the original interlock switch in order to 
make it look like the Plant had taken steps to improve the 
safety of the mixer.  
 In light of these incidents, the Company, along with 
Faubert, Prisque, and Maury, were charged with lying to 
                                              
13 The doors had to be opened frequently during production to 
determine whether the cement was the right consistency.  
However, because of the interlock safety switch, every time 
the doors were opened the machine had to be restarted.  
Shepherd testified that this delay caused the cement line to 
become backed up during production.  
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OSHA inspectors and with attempting to obstruct their 
investigation into the employees’ injuries.  
E. Indictment  
On December 11, 2003, a federal grand jury sitting in 
the District of New Jersey indicted Defendants Prisque, 
Faubert, Maury, Davidson and the Company14
(1) knowingly discharge a 
pollutant into U.S. waters, without 
and in violation of a permit, in 
violation of the Clean Water Act, 
33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a) and 
1319(c)(2)(A);  
 on charges of 
conspiring, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, to 
(2) knowingly violate a 
requirement and prohibition of 
permits under the Clean Air Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 7413(c);  
(3) defraud the United States by 
obstructing the lawful functions of 
the [OSHA] and the [EPA] in 
enforcing federal workplace 
safety and environmental laws 
and regulations;  
                                              
14 Daniel Yadzinski, the Plant’s engineering manager and 
environmental manager, was also indicted, but was acquitted 
on all charges against him.  He is, of course, not a party to 
this appeal.   
 32 
 
(4) make false statements in 
matters within the jurisdiction of 
OSHA, EPA and the [FBI], in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001; and  
(5) corruptly influence and 
obstruct the administration of law 
under a pending proceeding 
before OSHA, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1505 and 1515(b).  
D. Ct. Op. 2.  The indictment also charged the defendants 
with committing, or aiding and abetting the commission of, 
substantive violations of the aforementioned laws.   
Maury was charged with making false statements to 
investigators concerning the December 4, 1999 oil spill 
(Count 3), the Coxe forklift accident (Count 5), and with 
obstructing the OSHA investigation into Coxe’s death (Count 
9).  He was also charged with substantive violations of the 
Clean Water Act for the pumping of the cement pit that 
resulted in the sheen on the Delaware River on December 5, 
1999 (Count 27), and the Number Four Pit from May to 
October 1999 (Counts 28-33).   
Davidson, in addition to the conspiracy charge, was 
indicted for substantive violations of the CWA for the 
pumping of the cement pit from December 1998 to February 
2000 (Counts 12-26), and for the pumping of the cement pit 
that resulted in the sheen on the Delaware River on December 
5, 1999 (Count 27).  Davidson was also charged with making 
false statements to investigators regarding that spill (Count 4). 
Prisque was charged with violating the CWA based on 
the pumping of the cement pit that resulted in the sheen on 
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the Delaware River on December 5, 1999 (Count 27) and 
with a substantive violation of the Clean Air Act for his 
participation in the burning of the Plant’s waste paint in the 
cupola between February and August 2003 (Count 34).  
Prisque was also charged with making false statements to 
OSHA officers concerning the Owens accident (Count 8), and 
with obstruction of a federal investigation for his role in 
concealing evidence regarding the Coxe forklift fatality, 
Marchan’s forklift injury, and the Velarde accident (Counts 9-
11).   
Faubert was charged with making false statements to 
OSHA officials concerning Marchan’s forklift accident 
(Count 7), obstructing the investigation of Marchan’s forklift 
accident (Count 10), and obstructing the investigation of the 
Coxe fatality (Count 9).   
The Company was also charged with numerous 
crimes, including making false statements regarding the 1999 
oil spill (Counts 3-4), the Coxe fatality (Count 5), and the 
Marchan accident (Count 7).  It faced obstruction charges for 
the attempts to conceal evidence of the Owens accident 
(Count 8) and the cause of Coxe’s death (Count 9), the extent 
of Marchan’s injury (Count 10), and the cause of Velarde’s 
cement mixer accident (Count 11).  Prosecutors also charged 
the Company with violating the CWA for the pumping of the 
cement pit from December 1998 to February 2000 (Counts 
12-26), the pumping of the cement pit that resulted in the 
sheen on the Delaware River on December 5, 1999 (Count 
27), and the pumping of the Number Four Pit in 1999 (Counts 
28-33).  Finally, the Company was charged with violating the 
Clean Air Act (Count 34). 
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F. Pre-Trial Issues 
Pre-trial discovery in this case was highly 
contentious.15
G. Trial & Sentencing 
  In May 2004, the Government sought (and 
eventually obtained) a protective order allowing it to defer 
production of otherwise discoverable statements by current 
and former employees of the Plant until 30 days before the 
start of trial.  The Government based this request on 
allegations of workplace harassment and intimidation against 
Plant employees and their concern that witnesses would be 
penalized for cooperating with the prosecution or would be 
too intimidated to testify at all.   
Trial began on September 27, 2005.  The United States 
called 50 witnesses—many of them employees of the 
Company—and three rebuttal witnesses.  Among the 
employees who testified were five unindicted co-conspirators:  
Joseph Maddock, the former safety and human resources 
director of the Plant; Donald Harbin, the Plant’s maintenance 
manager; George Shepherd, the general electrical foreman; 
Tom Dalrymple, who supervised emissions controls at the 
cupola and reported directly to Prisque; and Steven Wayda, 
the union representative at the Plant. 
The Defendants began presenting their case on 
February 8, 2006 and called another 52 witnesses.  All of the 
individual Defendants testified.  Defendants moved for a 
judgment of acquittal at the close of the Government’s case, 
                                              
15 For a more detailed account of the discovery proceedings in 
this case, see infra Part II. 
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and at the end of the evidence.  The Court reserved judgment 
and submitted all counts to the jury.  The Court also 
submitted to the jury, at the Defendants’ request, the lesser 
included offense (not charged in the indictment) of a 
negligent—as opposed to knowing—violation of the Clean 
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(A).  Negligent violations 
of the Act constitute misdemeanors, rather than felonies. 
Following these proceedings and after 10 days of 
deliberation, on April 26, 2006, the jury convicted the 
Defendants of almost all of the charges levied against them.16
                                              
16 The jury failed to reach a verdict on Count 2 of the 
indictment, which charged Faubert and the Company with 
making false statements to OSHA inspectors when Faubert 
told them that he was unaware of a pit excavated in the 
casting department that had supposedly collapsed on an 
employee’s leg.  Maury was acquitted on Count 5, which 
concerned his representation to OSHA inspectors that the 
forklift had been found to be in “perfect operating condition” 
immediately after the Coxe fatality.  The Company was 
acquitted on Count 6, which concerned alleged false 
statements to the NJDEP regarding the accuracy of NJDEP’s 
testing procedures.  And Prisque was acquitted on Count 10, 
which alleged that he had been part of efforts to convince 
Marchan to lie to the OSHA inspectors about the extent of his 
injuries from the forklift accident in 1999.  And, finally, 
though not relevant to this opinion, Daniel Yadzinski, the 
Plant’s engineering manager and environmental manager, was 
acquitted of all charges against him.   
  
Notably, though the Company was convicted of felony 
violations of the CWA for the 1999 spill on the Delaware 
 36 
 
River and the unpermitted pumping of the cement pit (Counts 
12-26, 27), the jury concluded that Prisque, Maury and 
Davidson were guilty only of negligent violations for those 
incidents.  The jury found the Company and Maury guilty of 
felony violation of the CWA for the unpermitted pumping of 
wastewater from the Number Four Pit (Counts 28-33).  All 
Defendants were convicted of having knowingly and willfully 
engaged in a conspiracy to achieve the purposes set out in the 
indictment. 
Following the jury verdicts, the Defendants filed an 
omnibus post-trial brief that raised a multitude of challenges 
to the jury’s verdicts and to the District Court’s handling of 
the case.  In August 2007, the District Court ruled on the 
Defendants’ post-trial motions, rejecting the majority of those 
challenges, but granting Rule 29 judgments of acquittal for 
insufficient evidence on the following: (1) one false statement 
charge against Faubert and the Company, for the jury’s 
failure to reach a verdict (Count 2); (2) one CWA charge 
against Davidson and the Company, concerning an alleged 
unlawful discharge of wastewater in September 1999 (Count 
21); and (3) one CWA charge against Maury and the 
Company concerning an alleged unlawful discharge of 
wastewater in October 1999. The Court denied the Rule 29 
motions as to all other counts of conviction.  
The District Court held sentencing hearings in April 
2009.  It sentenced Prisque to 70 months’ imprisonment, 
Faubert to 41 months’ imprisonment, Maury to 30 months’ 
imprisonment, and Davidson to 6 months’ imprisonment.  As 
for the Company, the Court opted to apply the Alternative 
Fines Act (the “AFA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c)(1), rather than 
the CWA and CAA, in imposing criminal penalties.  
Applying the AFA, the Court fined the Company the 
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maximum penalty of $500,000 per violation on Count 1 
(conspiracy), Counts 8-11 (obstruction), Counts 12-16 
(CWA—cement pit discharge), Counts 28-32 (CWA—
Number Four Pit discharge), and Count 34 (CAA) for a total 
fine of $8 million dollars.  It also sentenced the Company to 4 
years’ probation, with a court-ordered monitor to ensure 
regulatory compliance going forward.   
 The Defendants timely appealed to this Court in May 
2009. 
H. The Present Appeal & the Parties’ 
Arguments17
Jointly, the Defendants raise a multitude of arguments, 
principal among them that (1) they were afforded inadequate 
pre-trial discovery under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, (2) the Government withheld substantial 
Brady and Giglio material and engaged in numerous acts of 
prosecutorial misconduct, and (3) the District Court erred in 
instructing the jury on the appropriate standard of mens rea 
for a negligent violation of the CWA.  They also raise 
numerous challenges to the District Court’s handling of the 
proceedings themselves, including its evidentiary rulings and 
the adequacy of the voir dire.   
 
The Defendants’ individual claims on appeal are 
equally numerous.  The Company, in addition to challenging 
the adequacy of the Rule 16 discovery it received, argues that 
the District Court erred in denying its motions for acquittal 
                                              
17 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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and for a new trial.   It also challenges the reasonableness of 
the criminal penalties imposed by the District Court under the 
AFA.   
Faubert contests the sufficiency of the evidence used 
to convict him; argues that there was a fatal duplicity in the 
charged objectives of the conspiracy, and challenges the 
sentence imposed by the District Court.   
Davidson argues that the verdicts against him for 
conspiracy and for negligent violation of the Clean Water Act 
are mutually exclusive; that the Government failed to prove 
essential elements of the crimes charged against him, that 
there was a variance in one of the charges against him, that 
the government “released false discovery” that hampered his 
ability to defend himself, and that he was prejudiced by the 
“unfair charging practice of the government.”  Davidson Br. 
24, 26.   
Prisque, like Davidson, argues that the verdicts against 
him were mutually exclusive.  He also claims that the 
Government engaged in a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct 
against him, that the evidence was insufficient to convict him, 
and that the District Court erred in imposing his sentence. 
Finally, Maury challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence against him.  He also argues that his false statement 
conviction stemming from the December 1999 oil spill 
(Count 3) should be dismissed because the question posed to 
him was too ambiguous to support the charge, that there was 
a variance between the indictment and the evidence against 
him on that same charge, and that the District Court erred in 
allowing prejudicial testimony against him.  
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II. Discovery Issues   
The Defendants raise many challenges to the degree of 
criminal discovery they were afforded throughout the 
proceedings in this case.  Among the many arguments they 
raise, the Defendants argue that the District Court erred in its 
interpretation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a), as it applies to 
organizational or, in this case, corporate defendants.   
We find the issue concerning the question of the extent 
of a corporate defendant’s right to discovery under Rule 
16(a)(1)(C) to be the most deserving of attention and further 
discussion, and we therefore address it herein.  Because we 
find that the discovery the Defendants received was adequate 
and in keeping with the standards of Fed. R. Crim. P. 16, we 
discern no error in the District Court’s handling of discovery 
in this case.   
A. Pre-Trial Discovery in a Criminal Case 
The Defendants’ arguments raised issues involving 
several overlapping aspects of pre-trial criminal discovery.  
We begin with a brief overview of a criminal defendant’s 
right to discovery of the evidence that the government intends 
to use against him at trial.  In a criminal trial, the government 
is subject to three sets of disclosure obligations: those 
imposed under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. §3500(b), those 
imposed by Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 (“Rule 16”), and those 
imposed by the Supreme Court’s holding in Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
1. Jencks Material 
Pursuant to the Jencks Act, implemented by Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.2, any time that a government 
witness testifies on direct examination, the defendant is 
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entitled to a copy of “any statement . . . of the witness in the 
possession of the United States which relates to the subject 
matter as to which the witness has testified.”  18 U.S.C. § 
3500(b)(2).  Provided the government contests the relevance 
of any portion of the statement, it must submit the entire 
statement to the court for in camera review.  Id. § 3500(c).  A 
“statement” is defined as (1) any written statement made and 
signed or adopted by the witness; (2) a “stenographic, 
mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription 
thereof” that recites “substantially verbatim”, and was made 
contemporaneously with, the witness’s statement; or (3) a 
recording or transcript of grand jury testimony.  Id. § 3500(e). 
The purpose of Jencks disclosure is to provide the defendant 
with an opportunity to review the witness’s statements for any 
possible inconsistencies that he might use to impeach the 
witness.  United States v. Rosa, 891 F.2d 1074, 1076-77 (3d 
Cir. 1989).  Importantly, in light of this purpose, the 
government has no obligation to produce Jencks material 
until the witness has testified.  18 U.S.C. § 3500(a).18
2. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 
  This 
limitation does not apply to testimony by the defendant 
himself.  Id.; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 16. 
The bulk of the government’s pre-trial disclosure 
obligations stem from Rule 16, which requires that the 
government, “[u]pon a defendant’s request,” allow the 
                                              
18 Despite this limitation, many federal prosecutors routinely 
turn over Jencks material a few days before the witness 
testifies.  
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defendant access to certain categories of information that the 
government has collected over the course of its investigation.  
With respect to an individual defendant, the 
government must disclose  
(1) “[A]ny relevant oral statement made by the 
defendant, before or after arrest, in response to 
interrogation by a person the defendant knew was a 
government agent if the government intends to use the 
statement at trial.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A).  
(2) Any relevant “written or recorded statement by the 
defendant” if the statement is in the government’s 
possession or control, and the government knows of 
the statement.  Id. 16(a)(1)(B)(i). 
(3) Any written record containing the substance of a 
defendant’s oral statements provided the statement is 
made in response to interrogation by a person the 
defendant knew to be a government agent.  Id. 
16(a)(1)(B)(ii). 
(4) Any recordings of the defendant’s grand jury 
testimony, if related to the offense.  Id. 
16(a)(1)(B)(iii).   
Organizational or corporate defendants are also 
entitled to pre-trial discovery.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C).  
However, in this context, the meaning of Rule 16 shifts.  An 
organization has no self-knowledge of its own conduct, since 
it acts through its agents, and must be afforded an opportunity 
to learn what of its employees’ conduct is being used against 
it at trial.  Thus, under Rule 16(a)(1)(C), an organizational 
defendant is entitled to any statement described in Rule 
16(a)(1)(A) and (B), above, so long as the government 
contends that the person making the statement:  
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(i) was legally able to bind the 
defendant regarding the subject of 
the statement because of that 
person’s position as the 
defendant’s director, officer, 
employee, or agent; or 
(ii) was personally involved in the 
alleged conduct constituting the 
offense and was legally able to 
bind the defendant regarding that 
conduct because of that person’s 
position as the defendant’s 
director, officer, employee, or 
agent. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C)(i), (ii).  It is only by learning 
what statements can be attributed to it as an organization that 
a corporate defendant can defend itself at trial. Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 16(a)(1)(C) Advisory Committee Notes to 1994 
Amendments. 
Moreover, the government must allow any defendant 
to review any “books, papers, documents, data, photographs, 
tangible objects, buildings or places” that are material to the 
defense, provided that the government intends to use that 
evidence in its case-in-chief or that the item was obtained 
from the defendant.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E). 
These obligations are subject to a carveout for attorney 
or agent work product “made . . . in connection with 
investigating or prosecuting the case.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 
16(a)(2).  Rule 16 also makes clear that it does not authorize 
“discovery or inspection of statements made by prospective 
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government witnesses except as provided” under the Jencks 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(2).  
3. Brady and Giglio material 
Finally, independent of these obligations, under Brady 
v. Maryland, a prosecutor has an obligation to disclose 
“evidence favorable to an accused” individual so long as it is 
“material either to guilt or to punishment.”  373 U.S. 83, 87 
(1963).  Evidence is “material” if there is a reasonable 
probability that, “had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  United States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 357-58 
(3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 
667, 682 (1985)).  “The prosecution must also disclose 
evidence that goes to the credibility of crucial prosecution 
witnesses.”  Buehl v. Vaughn, 166 F.3d 163, 181 (3d Cir. 
1999) (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 
(1972)). Referred to as Giglio material, this evidence is a 
subset of Brady material insofar as it addresses situations in 
which certain evidence about a witness’s credibility or 
motivation to testify exists, and where “the reliability of a 
given witness may well be determinative of guilt or 
innocence.”  Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (citing Napue v. Illinois, 
360 U.S. 264 (1959)).   
B.  Pre-Trial Discovery in this Case 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1) allows a court to, “for good 
cause, deny, restrict, or defer discovery or inspection, or grant 
other appropriate relief.”  In this case, the District Court 
granted a protective order allowing delayed disclosure of 
certain employees’ statements that the government sought to 
use in its case against the Company—in other words, 
statements that the Court believed fell within the reach of 
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Rule 16(a)(1)(C).  In granting that request, it reviewed in 
camera the statements themselves, and the Government’s 
affidavits in support of their motion.  It determined that 
delayed production was the only way to “protect the safety of 
prospective witnesses and the likelihood that they will appear 
and testify without intimidation or improper influence at 
trial.”  (J.A. 652.)  The Court also determined that alternative, 
less drastic proposals, such as producing the materials with 
redactions of the employees’ names, or ordering disclosure of 
a list of the sought after statements and allowing the full 
documents to be produced later, would “undermin[e] the 
effect of the protective order to be issued.”   (J.A. 652.)  
In the wake of the District Court’s initial decision 
granting the protective order, the Defendants filed several 
motions to compel discovery on a host of grounds.19
                                              
19  The Defendants filed motions to compel what they claimed 
was Brady material, Giglio material, and requesting early 
Jencks disclosure and rough notes from the OSHA and 
NJDEP inspectors, whom the government had not treated as 
“agents” within the meaning of Rule 16(a).   
  In 
October 2004, the Defendants also argued that, despite the 
Court’s protective order, they were immediately entitled to 
any and “all statements made by the ‘co-conspirators’ 
referenced in the Superseding Indictment, as the United States 
is clearly attempting to bind the [C]ompany by the acts and/or 
statements of those co-conspirators,” as well as “all 
statements of employees whose alleged conduct binds 
Atlantic States.”  ((J.A. 695.) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 
16(a)(1)(C) (the “Rule 16 motion”)). They argued that even if 
the employees’ identities were protected under the Court’s 
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order, any and all statements by the employees should be 
turned over immediately.  Importantly, these statements 
concerned not so much the scope of Rule 16(a)(1)(C), but 
whether the Defendants were entitled to anything under Rule 
16(a)(1)(C) prior to 30 days before trial.  See J.A. 695.  The 
Defendants’ continuing demands for information concerned 
the timing of the Government’s disclosures, not the scope 
thereof.  
 The Court reserved decision on the Rule 16 motion, 
pending further in camera review of the evidence, and noted 
that it would decide the Rule 16 motion in conjunction with 
the Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Protective 
Order.  The Court intended to use that additional in camera 
review to determine whether the scope of the protective order 
could be narrowed.  Following additional arguments and the 
Court’s in camera review, on February 17, 2005, the Court 
denied the motion to reconsider the protective order.   
On August 12, 2005, consistent with the Court’s 
protective order, the Government produced the previously 
withheld Rule 16(a)(1)(C) materials to the Defendants.  In all, 
the production consisted of documents for 24 witnesses.  
Portions of these documents were heavily redacted, in 
keeping with the Government’s understanding of the scope of 
Rule 16(a)(1)(C).  For individuals who could bind the 
Company by virtue of their position alone, the Government 
produced all oral statements that it intended to use at trial, and 
all written statements discussing issues on which the 
employee had the authority to bind the Company.  See Rule 
16(a)(1)(C)(i).  For all employees who were capable of 
binding the Company by virtue of their participation in the 
charged events, i.e. employees who had participated directly 
in the charged conduct, the Government produced all oral and 
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written statements discussing that specific conduct.  See Rule 
16(a)(1)(C)(ii). All other statements from these individuals, 
such as statements unrelated to the charged conduct or 
observations of the conduct of others, were redacted.   
Following this production, the Defendants sent a letter 
to the Court complaining about the Government’s redactions, 
noting that “the disclosures lack[] any indication to 
substantiate” the need for the protective order.  (J.A. 1533.)  
The Defendants “request[ed] that the summaries and 
transcripts be produced in unredacted form, so that the 
necessity for the Protective Order is clear.”  Id.  They did not 
object to the scope of the Government’s reading of Rule 
16(a)(1)(C).20
Full, unredacted versions of these documents were 
produced to the Defendants as Jencks material at least 3 days 
prior to the testimony of each witness.  Of course, for those 
individuals who did not testify, no such Jencks disclosure 
occurred.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a). 
 
C.  The Scope of Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C) 
On appeal, the Defendants argue that the District Court 
erred in its application of Rule 16(a)(1)(C) and that it 
deprived the Defendants of “an inordinate amount of critical 
discovery” in the process.  Joint Def. Br. 78.  They concede 
that the Government’s application of Rule 16(a)(1)(C)(i), 
                                              
20 The Defendants continued to file motions to compel 
discovery on other grounds.  See, e.g., J.A. 1737-38 (“Motion 
to Compel Production of United States Attorney and 
Investigator Rough Notes”).  
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which governs individuals “legally able to bind the defendant 
regarding the subject of the statement” because of their 
position of authority, was in keeping with the requirements of 
that rule.  See Joint Def. Br. 77.  However, they argue that the 
discovery they received under Rule 16(a)(1)(C)(ii) was 
unduly narrow insofar as it was limited to statements by 
employees about the specific offending conduct.21
The Defendants urge us to read Rule 16(a)(1)(C)(ii) to 
require that, “[o]nce an employee participated in the 
misconduct, all statements given by that employee should 
have been disclosed, even if unrelated to the misconduct.” 
Joint Def. Br. 80 (emphasis omitted).  The Government 
responds that the Defendants’ argument is subject to plain 
error review because they failed to raise a challenge to the 
redactions under Rule 16(a)(1)(C)(ii) before the District 
Court.  In any event, it argues, their redactions were in 
keeping with the scope and reach of Rule 16(a)(1)(C)(ii).  
 
1. Applicable standard of review 
Though we review a district court’s application of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, including its decisions 
                                              
21 The Defendants raise this issue jointly and argue that they 
are all entitled to a new trial as a result of this supposed error.  
Rule 16(a)(1)(C), however, benefits organizational defendants 
alone, and an individual defendant is not entitled to discovery 
of the statements of his codefendants.  Cf. United States v. 
Randolph, 456 F.2d 132, 135-36 (3d Cir. 1972).  Therefore, 
even were we to find reversible error, only the Company 
would be entitled to the benefit of our ruling.   
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denying or limiting discovery, for an abuse of discretion, see 
Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Fahie, 419 F.3d 249, 258 (3d Cir. 
2005), our review of a court’s interpretation of the meaning or 
reach of a rule is plenary, see United States v. Toliver, 330 
F.3d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 2003).  Claims of error in criminal 
discovery that are raised for the first time on appeal are 
subject to plain error review.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).  
 We agree with the Government’s contention that plain 
error review governs this argument on appeal.  Despite the 
Defendants’ contentions to the contrary, the record 
demonstrates that they failed to directly challenge the 
appropriate scope of discovery available under Rule 
16(a)(1)(C)(ii) before the District Court.  In their reply brief, 
the Defendants point to three statements before the District 
Court which, they contend, adequately presented the issue for 
the District Court’s review: (1) their statement at the hearing 
for the Protective Order that said, “make no mistake about 
that—we want the entire statements and the rough notes,” 
J.A. 582; (2) their motion to compel discovery, in which they 
sought all statements from the relevant employees, even if the 
employees’ identities were not discoverable per the Court’s 
protective order, J.A. 696; and (3) their post-production letter 
in which they complained about the Government’s redactions 
and “request[ed] that the summaries and transcripts be 
produced in unredacted form, so that the necessity for the 
Protective Order is clear.” (J.A. 1533.)   
However, while these statements do reference Rule 16, 
they do so in the context of challenging the reach and 
necessity of the Court’s Protective Order, both prior to and 
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after the Government’s production.22
Before an appellate court can correct an error not 
properly preserved before the District Court, it must find that 
“(1) there was error; (2) the error was clear or obvious; (3) the 
error affected the defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) the 
error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of the legal proceeding.”  United States v. Tyson, 
653 F.3d 192, 211 (3d Cir. 2011); see also United States v. 
Williams, 464 F.3d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 2006).  We find no such 
“clear or obvious” error in this case.  
  None squarely presents 
the Court with the question of whether, under Rule 
16(a)(1)(C)(ii), the scope of discovery is limited to only those 
statements that reference the offending conduct, or instead 
reaches any statement from an employee who has participated 
in that conduct.  Therefore, because the Defendants never 
squarely presented the Court with this challenge, we hold that 
plain error review applies to the Defendants’ claim. 
                                              
22 We note that the Defendants have not directly challenged 
the appropriateness of the order itself.  Had they, we would be 
hard pressed to find that the Court abused its discretion given 
the circumstances presented in this case and the evidence 
before the Court at the time of its decision.  United States v. 
Hedaithy, 392 F.3d 580, 605-06 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining 
that a district court abuses its discretion only where its 
“decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an 
errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to 
fact” (citation and internal quotation omitted)).  
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2. Rule 16(a)(1)(C)(ii) 
We know of no circuit court opinion that has 
confronted the precise scope of discovery available under 
Rule 16(a)(1)(C)(ii).  This dearth in law alone makes it 
particularly challenging for the Defendants to prove that the 
discovery they received was plainly erroneous under the law 
as it stands.  See United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 323 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (stating that an error is “clear or obvious” where 
the law at issue has been clarified at the time of the appeal).  
Moreover, because the Defendants never challenged the 
Government’s application of Rule 16(a)(1)(C)(ii) directly, 
there is no clear ruling by the District Court on this issue.  We 
are left only to consider whether the discovery the Defendants 
received was clearly at odds with the language of Rule 
16(a)(1)(C).  We conclude that it was not.  
Under Rule 16, an individual is entitled to essentially 
(1) any oral statement made in response to interrogation by a 
government agent, provided that the government intends to 
use that statement at trial; (2) copies of any written or 
recorded statement by the defendant—or any record 
containing the substance of that statement—provided it is 
within the control of the government; and (3) the defendant’s 
grand jury testimony relating to the offense.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 
16(a)(1)(A), (B).  Such statements are often admissions and 
can be used to bind the defendant at trial.  Pre-trial discovery 
allows an individual defendant the opportunity to seek 
suppression of these statements before they are introduced 
into evidence at trial, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C) 
Advisory Committee Notes to 1994 Amendments, and to 
evaluate the weight of such direct evidence against him in 
deciding whether to take a plea or face trial.    
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Rule 16(a)(1)(C) imports the individual-defendant 
discovery rules in subsections (a)(1)(A) and (B) to the context 
of organizational defendants, such as the Company in this 
case.  The Advisory Committee Notes pertaining to this 
portion of Rule 16 make it clear that the disclosure 
requirements “apply equally to individual and organizational 
defendants.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C) Advisory 
Committee Notes to 1994 Amendments (emphasis added).  
This, in our view, indicates that the same limitations and 
driving principles which control in the individual context 
transfer, through incorporation, to the discovery rights 
afforded to organizational defendants under Rule 16(a)(1)(C).  
Of course, organizations are able to act or speak only 
through their agents.  The statements of agents can bind the 
corporation.  See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(C), (D).  And, 
“[b]ecause an organizational defendant may not know what 
its officers or agents have said or done in regard to a charged 
offense, it is important that it have access to statements made 
by persons whose statements or actions could be binding on 
the defendant.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 Advisory Committee 
Notes to 1994 Amendments.  Rule 16(a)(1)(C) thus entitles 
an organizational defendant to those very statements.  See id.  
In terms of evidence, an organization such as a 
corporation can be bound by the words of its employees in 
two basic ways: first, by a statement from a person with 
authority to speak on the behalf of the organization on that 
subject; second, by a statement from an employee or agent of 
the organization on a matter within the scope of his assigned 
conduct.  See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2).  Such statements are 
admissible against the principal because we view the speaker, 
in these situations, as speaking for or as the principal.  
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Rule 16(a)(1)(C) similarly limits the disclosure 
afforded to those “statements made by a person who the 
government contends,” falls in one of two categories.  Those 
who 
(1) [were], at the time of making the statement, so 
situated as a director, officer, employee, or agent as to 
have been able legally to bind the defendant in respect 
to the subject of the statement; or 
(2) [were], at the time of the offense, personally 
involved in the alleged conduct constituting the 
offense and so situated as a director, officer, employee 
or agent as to have been able to legally bind the 
defendant in respect to that alleged conduct. 
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C).   Thus, two classes of 
individuals can make statements that are sufficient to 
constitute admissions against the corporation, which are thus 
discoverable under Rule 16(a)(1)(C):  (1) representatives, or 
individuals who have the power to bind an organization by 
virtue of their authority to make statements on the subject on 
behalf of the organization, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 
16(a)(1)(C)(i); and (2) employees who engage in illegal 
conduct within the scope of their jobs and then make some 
statement about having done so, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 
16(a)(1)(C)(ii).   
 Against this backdrop, we think the second category, 
which references “the conduct constituting the offense” and 
the ability “to bind the defendant in respect to that alleged 
conduct,” contemplates that the statements governed by Rule 
16(a)(1)(C)(ii) are tethered to the conduct itself.  In keeping 
with traditional notions of agency and vicarious liability, it is 
only in this context that the employee “speaks” on the behalf 
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of the Company as concerns the charged conduct against 
which the organizational defendant must defend itself.   
Indeed, and perhaps most convincingly, any broader 
reading begins to afford organizational defendants greater 
rights than those afforded to individual defendants.  Rule 16 
recognizes the dueling identities of an organization’s average 
employee: first, as a situational agent of the Company and 
second, as an average, run-of-the-mill fact witness.  The 
further a general employee’s statements diverge from 
admissions about having engaged in a form of conduct on 
behalf of the Company, the more they begin to resemble 
general, fact-based, witness statements.  Such statements are 
not discoverable to individual defendants prior to the 
witness’s trial testimony and until the Government’s Jencks 
obligations kick in.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(2); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3500.  To make such statements discoverable under Rule 
16(a)(1)(C) would grant organizational defendants a windfall, 
by allowing such defendants to use Rule 16 as a means of 
gaining early access to witness’s inculpatory statements when 
non-organizational defendants have no such right.  See United 
States v. Dessange, No. 99-Cr.-1182, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
2557, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2000); United States v. Lin 
Lyn Trading, Ltd., 911 F. Supp. 494, 497 (D. Utah 1996); 
United States v. Bhutani, No. 93-585, 1995 WL 632069 (N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 1, 1995) (explaining that Rule 16 reaches only those 
statements that are in the nature of admissions).  To the extent 
a defendant wishes to use those statements to contradict the 
witness, or to draw the witness’s credibility into question at 
trial, that is the stuff of Jencks disclosures and is adequately 
accounted for by that requirement.  
The Defendants rely on United States v. Chalmers—a 
case from the Southern District of New York that was 
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decided after discovery in this case—in support of their 
proposition that once an employee has engaged in bad 
conduct sufficient to bind the organization, all statements of 
the employee are discoverable under Rule 16(a)(1)(C). 410 F. 
Supp. 2d 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).  In Chalmers, the court held 
that under Rule 16(a)(1)(C) “the Government must disclose 
all statements made by persons whose actions it alleges bind 
the [organizational defendant].”  Id. at 291.  However, we 
note that other courts, including one other court from the 
same district, have reached conclusions similar to our own.  
See Dessange, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2557, at *8; Lin Lyn 
Trading, Ltd., 911 F. Supp. at 494; Bhutani, 1995 WL 
632069.  Moreover, the Chalmers holding creates the very 
windfall we think must be avoided by closely focusing on the 
conduct that binds the organization under Rule 
16(a)(1)(C)(ii). 
We have long held that Rule 16 is not to be used as a 
tool for general evidence-gathering prior to trial.  See United 
States v. Randolph, 456 F.2d 132, 136 (3d Cir. 1972) (“Rule 
16 does not require the prosecution to disclose ‘all the 
minutia of its evidence, to reveal its trial strategy, and to 
delineate with total specificity the case it intends to 
present.’”) (quoting United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 
407, 411 (3d Cir. 1969) cert. denied, sub nom. Pannacione v. 
United States, 396 U.S. 837 (1969)).  Because the 
Defendants’ interpretation of the rule would effectively allow 
that very result and, in so doing, give organizational 
defendants a substantial advantage in criminal proceedings, 
we must reject it as an incorrect reading of Rule 
16(a)(1)(C)(ii). 
Rather, we conclude that where a statement itself is 
being used to bind the Company, Rule 16 affords an 
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organizational defendant the opportunity to access that 
statement—and only that binding statement—prior to trial so 
that the defendant can seek to have it suppressed and can 
attempt to estimate the damage that might be inflicted by it at 
trial.  This is consistent with and equal to the discovery 
allowed to individual defendants under Rule 16(a).  The 
discovery afforded to the Defendants in this case was in 
keeping with this reading, and therefore was not plainly in 
error. 
III. Jury Instructions on the Clean Water Act 
Violations 
Defendants raise two primary challenges to the District 
Court’s instructions to the jury.  First, they argue that the 
District Court erred in defining the culpable mental state for a 
misdemeanor violation of the CWA as simple negligence, 
rather than gross negligence.  Second, they argue that the 
District Court erred in refusing to include language stating 
that a showing of recklessness could not meet the mens rea 
for the charged offenses, all of which required that the 
Government prove a “knowing” or “willful” violation of the 
applicable law.23
A. Negligence Instruction Under the Clean Water Act 
  Both arguments fail. 
The Defendants were indicted on charges of felony, or 
“knowing,” violation of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A) 
                                              
23 With the exception of the misdemeanor crime under the 
Clean Water Act, all of the charged crimes required that the 
government show that the Defendant knowingly engaged in 
the proscribed conduct. 
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(Counts 12-33). 24
                                              
24 Section 1319(c)(2) reads:  
  However, late in the trial, the Defendants 
requested that the District Court also instruct the jury on the 
(2) Knowing violations. Any person who— 
(A) knowingly violates . . . [this 
Act] . . . , or any permit condition 
. . . , or any requirement imposed 
in a pretreatment program . . . or 
in a permit issued under [this Act] 
. . . by the Secretary of the Army 
or by a State . . . . or 
(B) knowingly introduces into a 
sewer system or into a publicly 
owned treatment works any 
pollutant or hazardous substance 
which such person knew or 
reasonably should have known 
could cause personal injury or 
property damage or, other than in 
compliance with all applicable 
Federal, State, or local 
requirements or permits, which 
causes such treatment works to 
violate any effluent limitation or 
condition in a permit issued to the 
treatment works under [this Act] 
by the Administrator or a State; 
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lesser-included misdemeanor offense, which penalizes 
negligent violations of the Act, or of any permits issued under 
the Act.25
                                                                                                     
shall be punished by a fine of not 
less than $5,000 nor more than 
$50,000 per day of violation, or 
by imprisonment for not more 
than 3 years, or by both. 
  Specifically, they requested that the District Court 
25 Section 1319(c)(1) reads: 
(1) Negligent violations.  Any person who— 
(A) negligently violates 
[provisions of the CWA], or any 
permit condition or limitation . . .  
in a permit issued under [the 
CWA]  by the Administrator or by 
a State, or any requirement 
imposed in a pretreatment . . . ; or 
(B) negligently introduces into a 
sewer system or into a publicly 
owned treatment works any 
pollutant or hazardous substance 
which such person knew or 
reasonably should have known 
could cause personal injury or 
property damage or, other than in 
compliance with all applicable 
Federal, State, or local 
requirements or permits, which 
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instruct the jury that a “person negligently violates the Clean 
Water Act by failing to exercise the degree of care that 
someone of ordinary prudence would have exercised in the 
same circumstances.”  ((J.A. 5629) (Defendants’ proposed 
jury instructions (citing United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 
1116 (9th Cir. 1999))).  The District Court agreed to charge 
the jury with the lesser included offense, as it was required to 
do.  See Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973) 
(“[T]he defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser 
included offense if the evidence would permit a jury 
rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit 
him of the greater.”). 
 The Court’s instruction to the jury on the misdemeanor 
provision of the CWA read, in relevant part, as follows:  
[Y]ou may still consider whether 
the government has proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt that 
defendant is guilty of the offense 
of negligently violating that Act. . 
                                                                                                     
causes such treatment works to 
violate any effluent limitation or 
condition in any permit issued to 
the treatment works . . . ; 
shall be punished by a fine of not 
less than $2,500 nor more than 
$25,000 per day of violation, or 
by imprisonment for not more 
than 1 year, or by both.  
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. . “Negligence” may be defined 
as a failure to exercise, in the 
given circumstances, that degree 
of care for the safety of others 
which a person of ordinary 
prudence would exercise under 
similar circumstances.  It may be 
the doing of an act which the 
ordinary prudent person would 
not have done, or the failure to do 
that which the ordinary prudent 
person would have done, under 
the circumstances then existing. 
(J.A. 7209.)  The Court then made it clear that “[t]he Clean 
Water Act [was] the only offense in th[e] [i]ndictment that 
can be violated negligently.  All of the other offenses require 
knowledge and/or willfulness.” Id.   
 Despite having initially requested the lesser offense 
charge and recommended the simple negligence language to 
the Court, the Defendants now object to the Court’s 
instruction on the level of mens rea required to support a 
conviction under § 1319(c)(1) of the CWA, because they say 
the misdemeanor provision requires a showing of gross, 
rather than simple, negligence. They rely on the argument that 
the common law, the Model Penal Code and, as of 2004—
after this trial was completed—the Third Circuit Model Jury 
Instructions all define criminal negligence to require a 
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showing of gross negligence.26
                                              
26 The Model Penal Code defines criminal negligence as a 
failure to perceive “a substantial and unjustifiable risk” of the 
harm that occurred.  Model Penal Code, § 2.02(2)(d) 
(defining mental state for criminal negligence).  The Third 
Circuit Model Criminal Jury Charges adopt the Model Penal 
Code definition, and via the commentary, note that the gross 
negligence instruction “should be used when the federal 
crime charged includes negligently as an element of the 
offense.  This happens most often in regulatory type offenses, 
such as violations of environmental laws.”  Third Circuit 
Model Criminal Jury Charges, § 5.09, Commentary (2004).  
  In response, the Government 
argues that the Defendants are barred from bringing this 
challenge under the “invited error doctrine,” which provides 
that a “defendant cannot complain on appeal of alleged errors 
invited or induced by himself.”  United States v. Console, 13 
F.3d 641, 660 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Because Defendants requested almost the 
exact instruction given, and made no request that the Court 
instruct on gross negligence, rather than simple negligence, 
the Government contends that the Defendants cannot now 
attack the District Court’s instructions.  Alternatively, the 
Government argues—and the Defendants concede—that plain 
error review applies, since the Defendants did not challenge 
the instructions at trial.  The Government asserts that, because 
other circuits have stated that simple negligence is the 
appropriate standard under the Clean Water Act, the District 
Court’s decision to rely on those cases was not plainly 
erroneous.   
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1. Invited Error Doctrine 
Under the invited error doctrine, “[a] defendant cannot 
complain on appeal of alleged errors invited or induced by 
himself.”  Console, 13 F.3d at 660 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “[W]here a defendant makes a 
request in favor of certain instructions, he waives the right to 
complain of error in such instructions on appeal.”  United 
States v. Andrews, 681 F.3d 509, 517 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012).  
However, we have held that “[w]here a defendant submits 
proposed jury instructions in reliance on current law, and on 
direct appeal that law is declared constitutionally infirm, we 
will not apply the invited error doctrine.  Instead, we will 
review for plain error.”  United States v. W. Indies Transp., 
Inc., 127 F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Johnson v. 
United States, 520 U.S. 461, 465-66 (1997)); Andrews, 681 
F.3d at 517 n.4 (describing exception as applying to instances 
in which the law relied on by defendant is found to be 
“constitutionally problematic”).   
It is uncontested in this case that the District Court’s 
jury instruction defined the standard for negligence under § 
1319(c)(1) of the CWA consistent with the Defendant’s own 
proposed language.  Compare J.A. 5629 (Defendants’ 
proposal) with J.A. 7209 (District Court’s instruction).  Thus, 
in order to except themselves from the application of the 
invited error doctrine, which otherwise bars their claim, 
Defendants must show that the law they relied on in 
proposing their instruction for simple negligence has since 
been found to be constitutionally problematic.  See Andrews, 
681 F.3d at 517 n.4.  Defendants argue that they qualify for 
this exception and that, in the alternative, special 
circumstances warrant departure from the invited error bar.  
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Because we find no qualifying change in the law on this issue 
and no such special circumstances, we disagree.  
a) Simple Negligence Under the 
Clean Water Act 
The Clean Water Act does not, itself, define the 
appropriate standard for negligence under § 1319(c)(1).  Nor 
has this Circuit weighed in on this issue.  
In proposing the simple negligence instruction to the 
District Court, the Defendants relied on the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in Hanousek, which held that the appropriate mens 
rea under § 1319(c)(1) was simple, rather than gross, 
negligence.  176 F.3d at 1121.  The Ninth Circuit began with 
the premise that Congress, in drafting statutes, intends to rely 
on the ordinary meaning of the words it uses.  Id. at 1120.  
Noting that Congress, in the CWA’s civil provisions allowing 
increased civil penalties against violators who demonstrated 
“gross negligence” or “willful misconduct,” 33 U.S.C. § 
1321(b)(7)(D), used the phrase “gross negligence” when it 
meant to do so, the Hanousek court concluded that Congress 
deliberately set forth a lesser standard in § 1319(c)(1).  See id. 
at 1121.  It also noted that Congress passed the Clean Water 
Act as a form of public welfare legislation, allowing it to 
“render criminal ‘a type of conduct that a reasonable person 
should know is subject to stringent public regulation and may 
seriously threaten the community’s health or safety.’”  Id. at 
1121 (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 
(1985)).   
Indeed, other Circuits have since concluded that 
simple, rather than gross, negligence is the appropriate mens 
rea for a misdemeanor violation of the CWA under 
§ 1319(c)(1).  In 2005, in United States v. Ortiz, the Tenth 
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Circuit relied on the plain meaning of the statutory text to 
determine that the use of “negligently” in § 1319(c)(1) 
referred to ordinary negligence—“a failure to exercise the 
degree of care that someone of ordinary prudence would have 
exercised in the same circumstance.”  427 F.3d 1278, 1283 
(10th Cir. 2005).  Though it noted that its decision was in 
accord with that of the Ninth Circuit in Hanousek, the Tenth 
Circuit believed that the plain meaning of the statute was 
clear on its face.  Id. at 1283.  More recently, in United States 
v. Pruett, the Fifth Circuit rejected a defendant’s argument 
that the district court had erred in defining the appropriate 
mens rea under § 1319(c)(1) as ordinary negligence, rather 
than gross negligence.  681 F.3d 232, 242 (5th Cir. 2012) (per 
curiam).  Noting that negligence has a “plain and 
unambiguous meaning,” the Fifth Circuit found itself bound 
by § 1319(c)(1)(A)’s failure to specifically reference “gross 
negligence” as the appropriate mens rea, and therefore 
concluded that “§1319(c)(1)(A) requires only proof of 
ordinary negligence.”  Id.  The Pruett court, like the Ninth 
Circuit in Hanousek, noted that this plain text reading was 
bolstered by the fact that, where Congress had intended to 
require gross negligence, it had explicitly stated so in the 
plain language of the statute.  Id. at 242 n.5.       
b) Whether Hanousek has been 
Constitutionally Invalidated 
The Defendants argue that the reasoning of Hanousek, 
and by extension, the reasoning of circuits that have reached 
similar conclusions, have been clearly invalidated by the 
Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Safeco Insurance Company 
of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007).  Thus, they argue, the 
invited error doctrine does not apply to bar their argument on 
appeal.   
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In Safeco, the Supreme Court held that, under the civil 
enforcement provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a), an insurer “willfully” 
disregards his notice obligations to consumers if he acts in 
“reckless disregard” of those obligations.  551 U.S. at 52.  
The defendant insurance companies had argued against 
liability since, under the criminal provisions of the FCRA, 
willful conduct excludes mere recklessness and that the civil 
provisions should be read to include identical limitations.  Id. 
at 60.  The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that 
“willfully” for the purposes of the civil provisions, was 
broader and reached conduct that demonstrated a “reckless 
disregard” for its consequences.  Id. In reaching that 
conclusion, the Court relied heavily on the structure of the 
FCRA and, specifically, on the fact that Congress often 
explicitly uses modifiers such as “willfully” in the criminal 
context in order to “narrow[] the otherwise sufficient intent, 
making the government prove something extra, in contrast to 
its civil law usage.”  Id.  It held that, on the facts and statutory 
scheme before it, “[t]he vocabulary of the criminal side of 
FCRA is consequently beside the point in construing the civil 
side.”  Id.   
Whatever the import of the Safeco holding for future 
case law addressing the Clean Water Act, we are not 
persuaded that its holding so clearly overrules or undermines 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Hanousek so as to except the 
Defendants from the invited error doctrine.  See W. Indies, 
127 F.3d at 305 (applying the exception where “on direct 
appeal that law is declared constitutionally infirm” (emphasis 
added)).  Safeco was not a case of constitutional dimension.  
It dealt exclusively with the FCRA, and with the structure, 
intricacies and legislative history of that statute.  Nor did the 
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Court’s analysis indicate that it addressed broader principles 
of statutory construction relevant to this case.   
The Safeco Court addressed what it found to be the 
problems created by using the definition of “willful” conduct 
from the stricter, criminal side of the FCRA in order to 
interpret that same phrase, as it appeared in the civil, remedial 
side of the statute.  551 U.S. at 57 n.9.  Noting that “willful” 
is a word of many meanings, the Court stated that those 
meanings are often different in the criminal and civil 
contexts.  In the criminal law, it is often intended to heighten 
the burden on the prosecution in proving its case while, on the 
civil side, “use of the term . . .  typically presents neither the 
textual nor the substantive reasons” for imposing such a high 
burden on the plaintiff.  Id.; see also id. at 57 (“[W]here 
willfulness is a statutory condition of civil liability, we have 
generally taken it to cover not only knowing violations of a 
standard, but reckless ones as well.”).   
Here, however, we have a different statute, a different 
set of circumstances, and a different means of statutory 
interpretation. Notably, the Hanousek, Ortiz and Pruett courts 
reached their conclusions relying primarily on the plain text 
of § 1319(c)(1), in keeping with the canon of construction 
which provides that courts must follow the plain and 
unambiguous text of the statute when interpreting and 
applying criminal laws.  Neither Hanousek, nor the cases 
which followed, attempted to import a definition from outside 
the criminal provision before them.  Rather, each court 
concluded that negligence has an ordinary and well-accepted 
meaning, and that, where Congress intended to alter that 
meaning to demand a showing of “gross negligence,” it did so 
explicitly.  See Pruett, 681 F.3d at 242.   
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Certain portions of the Defendants’ brief also imply 
that the Model Penal Code and our own Model Criminal Jury 
Instructions indicate that the reasoning of Hanousek has been 
invalidated.  See Joint Reply 11. The Third Circuit Model 
Criminal Jury Instructions—published in 2004, after the 
District Court’s instruction to the jury in this case—
recommend an instruction of “gross negligence” for crimes 
that include negligence as an element of the offense.  See 
Third Circuit Model Criminal Jury Charges, § 5.09, 
Commentary (2004).  However, the Model Instructions are 
not-binding on this, or any, court.  They thus cannot 
invalidate the decisions of this Circuit or others.  Moreover, 
we note that our recommended instruction at § 5.09 relies on 
the Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(d).  While our model charges 
may have post-dated the District Court’s handling of this 
case, the Model Penal Code existed at the time that the 
Defendants drafted their proposed instruction under § 
1319(c)(1).  Thus, Defendants could easily have relied on the 
Model Penal Code in arguing for a higher standard before the 
District Court.27
In short, Hanousek, and the cases which followed it, 
remain good law.  We cannot say that they stand for 
  They did not do so.  This is the very 
situation that the invited error doctrine is intended to address. 
                                              
27 At argument, the Defendants’ counsel insisted that, because 
Hanousek was the only case law available at the time of the 
trial, the Defendants could not have “legitimately push[ed]” 
for a gross negligence charge under § 1319(c)(1).  Oral Arg. 
Trans., No. 09-2305, at 32 (Mar. 29, 2012).  Of course, the 
decisions of other circuits, while persuasive, are not binding 
on the district courts in this Circuit.  
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principles which have been “declared constitutionally infirm.”  
W. Indies, 127 F.3d at 305; see also Andrews, 681 F.3d at 517 
n.4.  We therefore conclude that the invited error doctrine 
should apply to bar the Defendants’ argument on appeal. 
Moreover, even were we to excuse the application of 
the invited error doctrine, the Defendants’ argument would 
still fail under plain error review.  To find plain error in a 
court’s jury instructions, we must find that “(1) there was 
error; (2) the error was clear or obvious; (3) the error affected 
the defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously 
affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the 
legal proceeding.”  Tyson, 653 F.3d at 211.  An error is “clear 
or obvious” only where the applicable law at issue has been 
clarified by the time of the appeal.  Riley, 621 F.3d at 323.  
As stated previously, Defendants cannot demonstrate that 
there was a clear error in this case.   
The Defendants asserted, at oral argument, that if one 
“analyze[s] the later developing law, and you look at it in the 
context of what the Model Penal Code was back then,” one 
realizes that it should have been plain to the Court that the 
simple negligence instruction was in error.  Oral Arg. Trans., 
No. 09-2305, at 31, (Mar. 29, 2012).  We disagree.  At the 
time that the District Court issued its instruction, the Ninth 
Circuit had concluded that simple negligence was the 
appropriate standard of mens rea under § 1319(c)(1) of the 
CWA.  Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116.  No circuit had held 
otherwise.  Moreover, since then, relying on textual 
interpretation alone, the Tenth Circuit has reached the same 
conclusion. See Ortiz, 427 F.3d 1278; see also Pruett, 681 
F.3d at 232.  Most telling, however, is the fact that this Court 
has not yet reached a contrary conclusion.  And though we 
need not reach this issue today, we note that we are now 
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confronted with a slowly expanding body of law from our 
sister circuits which indicates that simple or ordinary 
negligence may be the appropriate standard of mens rea under 
§ 1319(c)(1).  In sum, the supposed error, if any, was 
anything but “clear and obvious.”  Tyson, 653 F.3d at 211. 
Thus, notwithstanding that they invited the error they 
now claim was plainly erroneous, the Defendants’ argument 
that the District Court erred in defining the appropriate level 
of mens rea for negligence under § 1319(c)(1) of the CWA 
must fail.   
B. The District Court’s Refusal to Define 
“Recklessness” 
The Defendants argue that the concept of “negligent 
conduct” in this case did “double duty” as “it was the basis 
for misdemeanor liability under the CWA, and at the same 
time, it served as a defense to all of the felony charges,” since 
they required a showing of knowing or willful conduct.  Joint 
Def. Br. 61.  To that end, after asking the Court to instruct the 
jury on the lesser-included negligence charge under the 
CWA, the Defendants requested that the Court caution the 
jury that “negligence is not a valid theory of liability” on the 
remaining felony counts.  (J.A. 5646.)  The District Court 
granted this request in light of the fact that negligence was the 
basis for conviction under § 1319(c)(1)—the misdemeanor 
offense under the Clean Water Act.  
The Defendants also asked the District Court to 
include language instructing the jury on the definition of 
recklessness, and explaining that a showing of recklessness 
was insufficient to demonstrate knowing conduct.  Their 
proposed instructions therefore juxtaposed acts done 
“knowingly and willfully”—sufficient to render a felony 
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conviction—with acts done “negligently or recklessly.”28
                                              
28 For example, on the false statement charges, the 
Defendants proposed that the Court instruct the jury that 
“[t]he false statement at issue must have been a knowing and 
willful false statement instead of a mere negligent or reckless 
one.”  D. Ct. Op. 36 (discussing Defendants’ proposed jury 
instructions).  For the Clean Water Act violations, the 
Defendants proposed the following language: 
  D. 
Ct. Op. 36.  Though the District Court initially included the 
Defendants’ proposed language on recklessness in its jury 
instructions, it deleted that language from later drafts and, 
ultimately, from the final version.  The Court reasoned that 
recklessness was not an element of any of the charged crimes, 
To find a “knowing” violation of 
the Clean Water Act, you must 
find . . . that a defendant knew 
that he was discharging 
petroleum-contaminated 
wastewater and knew that the 
discharge was in violation of the 
authorized limits of the water 
permits.  Negligence or 
recklessness is not sufficient to 
satisfy the requirement of a 
knowing violation.  
Id. 
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and that discussing it risked confusing the jury in an already 
complex case and was not essential to the Defendants’ ability 
to argue their defense.  See J.A. 5768.  The Court also raised 
concerns that the instruction, were recklessness included, 
might actually misstate the applicable law on “willful” 
conduct.   
The Defendants now challenge the Court’s refusal to 
include their recklessness instruction, arguing that the Court’s 
instruction that negligence was insufficient to convict on the 
felony counts, combined with its refusal to instruct on gross 
negligence and recklessness, “erroneously defin[ed] 
‘knowingly’ under the felony counts” and “infected the jury’s 
understanding and evaluation of [their] mens rea defense.”  
Joint Def. Br. 61, 71.   
1. Accuracy of the Court’s Instructions on 
“Knowing” Conduct 
We review the legal accuracy of a district court’s jury 
instructions de novo.  United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 
137, 173-74 (3d Cir. 2008). Absent an affirmative 
misstatement of the applicable law, our review is for an abuse 
of discretion.  Id. at 174.  A trial judge retains broad 
discretion in this regard, so long as the court’s instructions 
“‘fairly and adequately submit [] the issues in the case to the 
jury.’”  United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 203 (3d Cir. 
2010) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hart, 
273 F.3d 363, 373 (3d Cir. 2001)).   
In its preliminary instructions to the jury, the Court 
was clear that “a person acts ‘knowingly’ if that person acts 
voluntarily and intentionally and not because of mistake or 
accident or other innocent reason.”  (J. A. 7149).  In 
instructing the jury at the close of the trial, the District Court 
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expounded on its earlier definition, providing separate mens 
rea charges for each offense in the indictment, and defining 
“knowing” conduct in the context of each charge.  For 
example, in defining “knowingly and willingly” for purposes 
of the conspiracy charge under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 1), the 
Court explained: 
A person acts ‘knowingly’ if that 
person acts voluntarily and 
intentionally and not because of 
mistake or accident or other 
innocent reason. . . . It is also the 
law that a person cannot be 
convicted of conspiracy if the 
state of mind of the defendant was 
in the nature of negligence. . . . I 
repeat that a defendant cannot be 
convicted of conspiracy . . . based 
on a state of mind that does not 
rise to the level of knowing and 
willful participation in the 
conspiracy.  A person acts 
‘willfully’ if that person acts 
voluntarily and with the specific 
intent or purpose to do something 
the law forbids or with the 
specific intent to omit something 
the law requires that person do; 
that is to say, with bad purpose 
either to disobey or disregard the 
law.   
(J.A. 7195.)  For the instruction on the false statement 
offenses, the Court explained that the government must prove 
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that the defendants “acted willfully, with knowledge of the 
statement’s falsity,” as “opposed to . . . innocently, 
unintentionally, or even negligently.” ((J.A. 7195, 7197-98) 
(charging the jury under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (Counts 2-7))).  On 
the obstruction of justice charges, it explained that a guilty 
verdict was appropriate only if the jury found that the 
defendants had acted “knowingly and dishonestly,” “with 
specific intent to subvert or undermine” a federal 
investigation. ((J.A. 7201) (charging the jury under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1505 (Counts 8-10)); see also J.A. 7203 (requiring a 
showing of “intent to impede, obstruct and influence” the 
OSHA investigation under 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (Count 11)).   
 In instructing the jury on the felony CWA violation, 
the Court made clear that the evidence had to demonstrate 
that the Defendants discharged the wastewater “intentionally 
and not as the result of ignorance, mistake or accident;” that 
they “knew the nature of the material discharged;” and that 
they “knew the discharge was in violation of” their CWA 
permits.  (J.A. 7208.)  Similarly, in instructing the jury on the 
CAA counts, the Court instructed the jury that it must find 
that the defendants “knew that an amount of waste paint in 
excess of 55 gallons per day was being burned in the cupola,” 
and that they “knowingly participated in causing that amount 
to be burned.” ( J.A. 7213.)   
 We note at the outset that these proffered instructions 
are consistent with our own case law and our recommended 
jury instructions concerning “knowing” conduct.  See W. 
Indies, 127 F.3d at 310 (noting, in the context of the CWA, 
that “[a]n act is done knowingly if done voluntarily and 
intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or other 
innocent reason.”); see also United States v. Flores, 454 F.3d 
149, 160-61 (3d Cir. 2006) (approving similar “knowing” 
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instruction); Third Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instruction 
5.02.   Indeed, the Defendants do not contest that the 
instructions were accurate statements of the law governing 
“knowing” conduct.  Rather, they argue that the District 
Court’s failure to include their additional proposed language 
regarding recklessness effectively lowered the standard for 
“knowing” conduct in the eyes of the jury.  
The Defendants argue that this entitles them to de novo 
review.  However, fundamentally their argument is that the 
District Court’s refusal to include their proposed language 
confused the jury and undermined their ability to present their 
defense.  We review such challenges for an abuse of 
discretion.  Hoffecker, 530 F.3d at 176. 
2. Abuse of Discretion in Rejecting 
Proposed Language 
A court’s “refusal to give a proposed instruction” 
constitutes an abuse of discretion “only if the omitted 
instruction is correct, is not substantially covered by other 
instructions, and is so important that its omission prejudiced 
the defendant." United States v. Piekarsky, 687 F.3d 134, 142 
(3d Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also Hoffecker, 530 F.3d at 176 (“[A] defendant is 
entitled to a theory-of-defense instruction if (1) he proposes a 
correct statement of the law; (2) his theory is supported by the 
evidence; (3) the theory of defense is not part of the charge; 
and (4) the failure to include an instruction of the defendant’s 
theory would deny him a fair trial” (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  “[A] defendant is not entitled to a 
judicial narrative of his version of the facts, even [if] such a 
narrative is, in one sense of the phrase, a ‘theory of defense.’”  
United States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 353 (3d Cir. 2011) 
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(quoting Hoffecker, 530 F.3d at 176) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 The Defendants argue that the Court’s instructions, in 
defining “knowing” conduct and stating that negligence was 
not sufficient to convict under the felony counts, “failed to 
define the intermediate mental states between simple 
negligence and willful or knowing conduct.”  Joint Reply 62.  
As a result, they argue, “the jury was forced to find [them] 
guilty of the felonies if their conduct rose even minimally 
above civil negligence.”  Id. at 65.  We disagree.  
 We have never held that a court must define a requisite 
mental state by defining and explicitly excluding all of the 
mental states that do not meet the threshold.  See Friedman, 
658 F.3d at 354; Hoffecker, 530 F.3d at 177; cf. Hanousek, 
176 F.3d at 1124 (holding under the CWA that the district 
court did not err in denying defendant’s request to further 
define the culpable mental state by explaining what it did not 
include).  The jury need only receive those instructions 
necessary to its understanding of what conduct will suffice to 
support a conviction.  Cf. Peterson, 622 F.3d at 203.  That 
standard is met here.  In light of the specificity of each 
instruction and the overall effect of these instructions read as 
a whole, we can only conclude that it was clear to the jury at 
the time of deliberation that only knowing, intentional 
conduct would suffice to render a conviction under each of 
these felony counts.  Anything below that threshold required 
an acquittal. 
Moreover, even assuming that the Defendants can 
demonstrate that their proposed instruction was correct and 
supported by the record—assertions called into question by 
the District Court’s well-reasoned post-trial memorandum, D. 
Ct. Op. 85-86—they cannot substantiate their claims that the 
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Court’s omission of their proposed language foreclosed their 
theory of the defense or worked a substantial prejudice 
against them.  See Piekarsky, 687 F.3d at 142; Hoffecker, 530 
F.3d at 177 (considering whether the theory of the defense 
was implicit in the charge and whether the omission denied 
defendant of a fair trial).   
Because the District Court’s instructions made clear 
that a showing of anything less than “knowing” or intentional 
conduct would not support a felony conviction, any 
instruction on recklessness, as requested by the Defendants, 
would have been duplicative of the clear mens rea standards 
set forth by the District Court.  See Hoffecker, 530 F. 3d at 
177 (noting that instructions on “lack of intent” as a theory of 
defense were duplicative of the district court’s instructions 
that knowing and willful conduct was required).  The 
Defendants were thus afforded ample room to argue to the 
jury that, “even if certain acts took place, at worse [sic] the 
activity was grossly negligent, or even reckless, but was not 
intentional,” Joint Def. Br. 65.  See Friedman, 658 F.3d at 
354; Hoffecker, 530 F.3d at 177; Hanousek, 176 F.3d at 1124.    
Recklessness, as a standard of mens rea, was never 
explicitly at issue in this case.  The District Court decided not 
to introduce that concept out of fear of confusing the jury, 
because the judge doubted its soundness under the law and 
thought it was already addressed adequately by her discussion 
of “knowing,” “willful” and “intentional” conduct.  That 
determination was well within the judge’s discretion.  We 
therefore affirm the jury instructions provided by the District 
Court. 
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IV. Mutually Exclusive Verdicts 
Though charged with felony violations of the CWA, 
33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2), Defendants Prisque and Davidson 
were convicted only of lesser-included misdemeanor or 
negligent violations under § 1319(c)(1)(A) (Counts 12-27).29
A defendant seeking acquittal for inconsistent verdicts 
has a tough row to hoe.  Consistency of verdicts is not 
necessary in a criminal trial.  United States v. Vastine, 363 
F.2d 853, 854 (3d Cir. 1996).  Rather, where a jury convicts 
on one count and acquits on another, in most circumstances, 
“the most that can be said . . . is that the verdict shows that . . 
. the jury did not speak their real conclusions” on one of the 
convictions.  Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932) 
(quoting Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir. 
1925)).  As a matter of law, courts treat this situation as an 
instance of juror lenity, undeserving as a basis for overturning 
a conviction.  Vastine, 363 F.2d at 855 (“That the verdict may 
  
The jury also found that Prisque and Davidson had knowingly 
and willfully participated in a conspiracy with the specific 
objective of violating the CWA (Count 1).  The Defendants 
now argue that these two verdicts are mutually exclusive and 
that we should thus vacate their conspiracy convictions 
(Count 1) on these grounds.  We will affirm. 
                                              
29 Defendant Maury was also charged with violations of the 
Clean Water Act (Counts 27, 28-33).  Though the jury 
convicted him of the lesser charge concerning the December 
1999 pumping and spill (Count 27), it convicted him of the 
felony counts concerning the pumping of the Number Four 
Pit (Counts 28-33).  
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have been the result of compromise, or of a mistake on the 
part of the jury, is possible.  But verdicts cannot be upset by 
tears” into such matters. (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)); see also Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 346 
(1981) (noting “the unreviewable power of a jury to return a 
verdict of not guilty for impermissible reasons”).  
In United States v. Powell, the Supreme Court 
determined that these same principles apply when a jury 
convicts on a conspiracy charge, but acquits on the 
underlying overt act, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984).  Conceding that 
the rule yields sometimes unsatisfying results, the Court held 
that it applied nonetheless.  Id.  (citing Dunn, 284 U.S. at 
393).  To argue that such inconsistencies should receive 
special treatment, particularly where the district court’s 
instructions were correct, “simply misunderstands the nature 
of the inconsistent verdict problem.”  Id. at 68.  “Whether 
presented as an insufficient evidence argument, or as an 
argument that the acquittal on the predicate offense should 
collaterally estop the Government on the compound offense, 
the argument necessarily assumes that the acquittal on the 
predicate offense was proper—the one the jury ‘really 
meant.’”  Id.  While inconsistent verdicts might be the 
product of juror mistake, compromise, or lenity, determining 
which requires the sort of impermissible speculation into the 
reasoning of a jury’s decision that courts have historically 
avoided.  Id. at 66.  Moreover, the Court wrote, when 
inconsistent verdicts present themselves, “‘error,’ in the sense 
that the jury has not followed the court’s instructions, most 
certainly has occurred, but it is unclear whose ox has been 
gored.”  Id. at 65.  Just as the Government has lost on one 
count, a defendant has received the advantage of an acquittal 
on the other.  Id. at 69.  
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However, though Powell explicitly foreclosed a 
defendant’s ability to challenge an inconsistent verdict 
involving a conviction of a conspiracy and an acquittal on a 
predicate act, the Court stated in a footnote that nothing in 
that decision was intended to decide the “proper resolution of 
a situation where a defendant is convicted of two crimes, 
where a guilty verdict on one count logically excludes a 
finding of guilt on the other.”  Id. at 69 n.8 (citing United 
States v. Daigle, 149 F. Supp. 409 (D.D.C. 1957)).30
Since Powell, this Circuit has had two occasions to 
determine the meaning of the Supreme Court’s footnote in 
Powell.  In United States v. Gross, we were confronted with a 
defendant who challenged a jury verdict that acquitted him of 
knowingly causing the filing of a false statement with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, but convicted him of 
insider trading and mail fraud.  961 F.2d 1097 (3d Cir. 1992).  
The defendant argued that Powell did not apply, since in his 
case the two verdicts both involved the same mental state: 
“knowingly and willfully.”  Id. at 1106-07.  We disagreed, 
 
                                              
30 In Daigle, the district court invalidated a jury’s guilty 
verdict for larceny when the jury also convicted the defendant 
of embezzlement.  Because embezzlement involves the 
conversion of property that a defendant rightfully had in his 
possession, but did not own, and larceny involves the carrying 
away of a good that the defendant had no right to possess in 
the first place, the two convictions could not be reconciled.  
The district court therefore struck the larceny verdict, stating 
that “where a guilty verdict on one count negatives some fact 
essential to a finding of guilty on a second count,” the two 
verdicts cannot both stand.  Id. at 414. 
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noting that the verdicts were not necessarily inconsistent, 
since a jury could have decided to acquit because one element 
of the acquitted crime was not supported by sufficient 
evidence, even if the knowledge requirement was satisfied as 
to both.  Id. at 1106 (“For example, . . . the government may 
have failed to make the required showing that [the defendant] 
‘caused’ the false statements to be filed.”).  We made clear 
that we interpreted Powell’s exception to narrowly apply to 
only “those situations where a jury has convicted a defendant 
of two crimes and those convictions are mutually 
exclusive”—or, put differently, where the defendant was 
“convicted of two crimes, at least one of which he could not 
have committed.”  Id. at 1107.   
Several years later, in Buehl v. Vaughn, we relied on 
Gross for the proposition that “logically incompatible guilty 
verdicts may not stand” in considering the claims of a habeas 
petitioner who argued that his trial counsel had been 
ineffective in failing to object to purportedly inconsistent 
verdicts. 166 F.3d 163, 178 n.11 (3d Cir. 1999) (Alito, J.).  
The petitioner had been charged with first-degree murder, 
third-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter, all based 
on the same conduct.  Id. at 177.  The jury convicted the 
Defendant on all counts, and the petitioner argued on appeal 
that this demonstrated that the jury had been confused as to 
what level of mens rea was supported by the evidence.  Id. at 
177-78.  Thus, the Buehl court considered whether, under 
Gross and Powell, a defendant could argue that two 
convictions based on the same conduct and same evidence 
could be “logically inconsistent” where one was essentially a 
lesser-included offense of the other.  We held that he could 
not because, “although involuntary manslaughter requires 
only recklessness or gross negligence, that element may be 
satisfied by proof that the defendant intentionally killed the 
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decedent, as the first degree murder statute requires.”  Id. at 
179 (internal footnote omitted); see also id. at 178 (quoting 
Masoner v. Thurman, 996 F.2d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 1993) for 
the proposition that a verdict will be upheld if “based on the 
evidence presented to the jury[,] any rational fact finder could 
have found a consistent set of facts supporting both 
convictions”).   
Therefore, in light of Powell, as explicated in Gross 
and Buehl, a defendant may only challenge dual guilty 
verdicts that are inherently and fundamentally at odds with 
one another.  Or, to put it differently, a conviction as to one of 
the crimes must negate an element of the other.  Moreover, 
the rule remains that, under Dunn, a defendant cannot 
challenge inconsistent jury verdicts if he was acquitted on one 
count and convicted on another.  With these principles in 
mind, it is difficult to see how Defendants Prisque and 
Davidson can succeed with their argument.  
 The jury found Prisque and Davidson guilty of 
multiple objectives underlying the conspiracy charged in 
Count 1 of the indictment.  In addition to the negligence 
charge under the CWA, the jury also found Davidson guilty 
of knowingly making materially false statements to NJDEP 
investigators following the December 1999 oil spill.  Prisque 
was found to have committed every offense charged as an 
objective of the conspiracy.  Thus, even were we to find some 
degree of inconsistency between the conviction under 
§1319(c)(1) of the CWA and the conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 371, the conspiracy conviction could still stand based on the 
jury’s verdict on the remaining underlying offenses.   When a 
defendant is charged with a multi-object conspiracy, the 
conviction will stand so long as the verdict as to any one of 
the underlying objectives of the conspiracy is sound.  See 
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United States v. Navarro, 145 F.3d 580, 590-91 (3d Cir. 
1998).   
 Even were we to ignore this fatal flaw in the 
Defendants’ argument, the argument would still fail.  Insofar 
as Prisque and Davidson attempt to argue that their acquittal 
on the felony charge under the Clean Water Act is 
inconsistent with their conviction for the conspiracy, that 
argument is foreclosed by Powell, supra; accord United 
States v. Mathis, 579 F.2d 415, 418 (7th Cir. 1978) (“Any 
arguable inconsistency arises not from the verdict of guilty of 
unarmed assault, but rather from the implicit verdict of not 
guilty of the offense of assault with a deadly or dangerous 
weapon.”). To the extent their argument is that the conviction 
for negligently violating the CWA under § 1319(c)(1) is 
inconsistent with the conspiracy conviction, one need only 
compare the elements of these crimes to see that there is no 
necessary inconsistency between the two.  Though the CWA 
instructions here required the jury to find a lower mens rea, 
the “failure to exercise in the circumstances that degree of 
care for the safety of others which a person of ordinary 
prudence would exercise under similar circumstances,” our 
case law indicates that a showing of a higher, “knowing” 
violation would suffice to meet this requirement.  See Buehl, 
166 F.3d at 179-80.  Alternatively, the conspiracy itself could 
predate the actual negligent violation, or vice versa.  
Evanchyk v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 933, 942 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(relying on this logic to uphold dueling guilty verdicts).     
Defendants attempt to avoid this seemingly foregone 
conclusion by arguing that, in this case, unlike in Buehl, 
“conspiracy and the substantive CWA violations were not a 
unitary offense,” but instead were “different counts, . . . 
involved different facts, different elements, and entirely 
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different statutory schemes.”  Davidson Br. at 24.  But these 
arguments neither render Buehl inapplicable nor help the 
Defendants’ case.  Instead, they serve to emphasize why the 
two convictions here—the first of negligent violation of the 
CWA, and the second, of knowingly participating in a 
conspiracy—are not mutually exclusive.  To hold otherwise 
would require the very sort of speculation and hypothesizing 
about the jury’s verdict that our case law clearly forbids.  
Thus, here, as in Powell, Defendants have been “given 
the benefit of . . . acquittal on the counts on which [they were] 
acquitted, and it is neither irrational nor illogical to require 
[them] to accept the burden of conviction on the counts on 
which the jury convicted.”  Powell, 469 U.S. at 69; see also 
Vastine, 363 F.2d at 854 (upholding conviction on conspiracy 
despite acquittal of defendants on the underlying substantive 
offenses).  Accordingly, we see no error in the District 
Court’s handling of this issue. 
V. Conclusion 
Having carefully considered the Defendants’ various 
remaining arguments, we find them to be without merit.31
                                              
31 We note that the Company filed a letter, pursuant to Rule 
28(j) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure notifying us 
of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Southern Union 
Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012).  We find that 
case inapplicable to the Company’s challenge to the criminal 
penalties imposed by the District Court.   
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We therefore affirm the final convictions, judgments and 
sentences of the District Court, in all respects.  
